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Abstract
Pandemic influenza outbreaks have historically entailed significant societal and
economic disruptions. Today, our quality of life is threatened by our inadequate pre-
paredness for the imminent pandemic. The key challenges we are facing stem from a
significant uncertainty in virus epidemiology, limited response resources, inadequate
international collaboration, and the lack of appropriate science-based decision support
tools. The existing literature falls short of comprehensive models for global pandemic
spread and mitigation which incorporate the heterogeneity of the world regions and
realistic travel networks. In addition, there exist virtually no studies which quantify
the impact of resource sharing strategies among multiple countries. This dissertation
presents three related models that contribute to filling the existing vacuum. The first
model develops optimal capacity management strategies for multi-region pandemic
surveillance. The second model estimates the pandemic propagation time from the
onset to a likely pandemic export region, such as a major transportation hub. The
model builds on a large-scale agent-based simulation and geographic information sys-
tems (GIS). The model is tested on a hypothetical outbreak in Mexico involving 155
regions and over 100 million people. The third model develops an empirical relation-
ship to quantify the impact of various U.S. - Mexico antiviral sharing strategies under
several pandemic detection and response scenarios.
vi
1. Introduction
Influenza is a respiratory infection caused by a virus which is endemic to the
humans. However, sometimes a virus can attack more people than expected causing
epidemics. Such epidemics can be identified by comparing the number of influenza like
illness (ILI) cases to historical values. When an epidemic spreads to more than one
country, or if the fatality or transmission ratios are very high, the epidemic is called
a pandemic. The virus most often associated with pandemic influenza (PI) is that
of type A. Influenza viruses are described by two key elements: hemagglutinin (H)
and neuraminidase (N) (e.g., H1N1, H3N2, H5N1). Additionally, every year antigenic
shifts can occur generating new virus subtypes. To cope with these changes, vaccines
should be formulated periodically [2]. When a novel virus subtype adapts to the
human population, our bodies can no longer develop immunity. Consequently, a PI
outbreak can start. The duration of an outbreak, the number of people and regions
affected, and the mortality ratio are directly related not only to how the virus is
transmitted, but also to the social and demographic characteristics of a society.
On May 9 of 1997, the first human case of H5N1, also known as Avian Flu,
appeared in Hong Kong [3]. A major slaughter of chickens was implemented in an
attempt to stop the bird-to-human transmission [4]. Nowadays, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO) has declared H5N1 human outbreaks in fifteen Asian and African
countries with a total of 438 infected cases, and the 59.8% case fatality ratio [5].
On March 18 of 2009, the Mexican government reported a suspicious ILI outbreak
in rural areas in the south of the country. By April 4, WHO confirmed that the
infection cases were caused by an aggressive novel subtype of influenza virus A/H1N1
[6]. At the end of April, WHO reported that this new subtype of H1N1 had been
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confirmed in several countries with over 182,166 cases. In the American continent,
approximately 1,579 of the 1,799 deaths were reported [7]. By mid-October, WHO
reported 400,000 confirmed cases, with at least 4,735 deaths, worldwide [8].
Despite the facts that the H5N1 virus is believed to be transmittable only by eating
food contaminated with fresh bird feces and that human-to-human transmission has
not been confirmed yet, there exists a major concern due to potential mutations
of the virus which can combine its code with another influenza virus capable of a
human-to-human transmission.
Nowadays, the international community has both antiviral drugs to reduce the
impact of influenza, and a capability to produce vaccines in a few months once the
virus is isolated and identified. However, antiviral drugs are perishable items that
cannot be stored in large quantities for long periods of time due to cost constraints.
On the other hand, at present vaccines are produced using a 50-year technology, mak-
ing it difficult to accurately forecast the production output. Additionally, a high level
of population compliance to vaccination campaigns is needed to stop the spread of a
pandemic. Past unfortunate experiences can affect the risk attitudes of the popula-
tion during vaccination campaigns. For example, a major public health vaccination
campaign was conducted by the United States government in 1976, trying to prevent a
major pandemic of H1N1 that did not actually happen. Major lawsuits and allegedly
vaccination-caused diseases established legal and social precedents which need to be
considered by public health officials today [9].
Figure 1 shows the world population density (from white to red) and the world
airports (green dots). It can be seen that most of the airports are concentrated in the
U.S. and Europe. Consequently, once an outbreak reaches these regions, it will be
almost impossible to contain the spread and hence a global outbreak will be inevitable.
On the other hand, it has been discussed in the literature [10] that it is probable that
an outbreak would start in a high density region in a poor rural area (most of them
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Figure 1: Map of the World Population Density and Major Airports
represented in red in Figure 1). However, with the exception of Southeast Asia, most
of these areas lack an effective PI surveillance system. As a consequence, when an
outbreak starts in one of these regions, it is just a matter of time before infected
travelers reach a region with a major travel hub. From that moment, it is just a
matter of days for the outbreak to spread around the world. This effect was observed
during the H1N1/2009 PI outbreak.
The possible global economic impact of PI was analyzed in a study developed by
the Lowy Institute for International Policy coordinated by experts of the Australian
National University [11]. This study analyzed four scenarios of PI: mild (H3N2 1967-
68 equivalent scenario), moderate (H2N2 1957-58 scenario), severe (1918 Spanish flu
scenario), and an ultra severe scenario (1918 Spanish flu scenario affecting equally
every demographic group in the population). By analyzing these scenarios, the au-
thors estimated that in our time a PI outbreak would cost a country between 1.5%
and 5% of its gross domestic product. This impact is attributable to school and com-
pany closures, (in)voluntary workforce reduction, and medical expenses. In the case
of the United States, the estimated impact ranges between $73.1 to $166.5 billion
dollars. The same study estimated the number of deaths in the U.S. to be 20,000
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(mild scenario), 200,000 (moderate scenario), 1M (severe scenario), and 2M (ultra
severe scenario).
Inefficiency of the global PI surveillance network can negatively affect the U.S.
preparedness in the event of a global PI outbreak. Furthermore, the U.S. also faces
some domestic preparedness and response issues. The first issue is related to the
cost and accuracy of the tests for virus diagnosis. The higher costs of more accurate
tests makes it economically infeasible to apply the tests to all individuals who present
ILI symptoms. On the other hand, low reliability (false negatives up to 70%) of
more economic and rapid tests can make medical personnel believe that even negative
results may be positive [12]. The second issue is that there exists a constrained supply
of response resources. For example, antiviral drugs are available for just a fraction of
the total population (the U.S. stockpile was only 6.7% of the population in 2008 [13]).
There can also be delays in the production of vaccines. Moreover, it is estimated that
up to 65% of the U.S. population would not be willing or would decide not to receive
the vaccine [14]. The existing pro-rata policy of the department of Health and Human
Resources (HHR) establishes a distribution of mitigation resources in proportion to
the population in each affected state [15]. However, this policy assumes that all
affected states have homogeneous affected population and simultaneous outbreaks.
As a result, extra resources can be assigned to regions where the outbreak is mild
or where the peak has already passed, while limited resources will be left to regions
where the outbreak is just beginning. Finally, the U.S. lacks a clear international
collaboration policy in the case of overseas-born PI outbreaks.
There exists a strong motivation for the U.S. to explore international collaboration.
If an outbreak starts overseas and is detected promptly, and if the country of origin
has appropriate pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions in place, then
the outbreak may be contained at the source [16]. However, developing countries may
not have enough supply of antiviral drugs, or their detection capabilities and health
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care infrastructure may be limited. Additionally, the countries may lack required
expertise to efficiently implement non-pharmaceutical interventions [17]. By sharing
pharmaceutical repositories, giving financial aid to develop proper surveillance and
health care systems, and training public health officials, the U.S. may help to protect
its population domestically. There is also a benefit that developing countries can
share their virus strains in a timely manner, so that the samples can be included in
the design of a vaccine [17]. Hence, the important question is how much and what
resources to share to delay, and possibly avoid, the arrival of overseas-born pandemics
to the U.S. soil.
Our research contributes to the development and improvement of the U.S. mit-
igation strategies during global influenza pandemics. In Chapter 2, we analyze the
status of the relevant academic literature and identify most significant gaps. Chapter
3 describes our research objectives. Chapter 4 presents a model to develop optimal
capacity management strategies for PI surveillance. Chapter 5 presents the agent-
based simulation model to estimate the outbreak lead time from the onset to a likely
pandemic export region for the testbed of Mexico. Chapter 6 develops an empirical
relationship for the outbreak lead time in order to examine U.S. - Mexico antivi-
ral sharing strategies in global pandemic scenarios. Chapter 7 summarizes the main
results, contributions, and future research opportunities.
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2. Literature Review
We classify the existing PI models into three main categories: statistical, dynamic
compartmental, and simulation-based models.
The main objective of the statistical models is to estimate epidemiological param-
eters with the use of statistical analysis and/or optimization tools, such as maximum
likelihood estimation, Markovian analysis, linear programming or regression-based
approaches. For example, Carrat et al. applied Markovian models to compare the
short-term influenza immunity obtained from vaccination to the long-term immunity
acquired from actual infection. The authors demonstrated that yearly vaccinations
during young years could make an individual more prone to the disease in his senior
years [18]. Becker and Starczak evaluated the effectiveness of a vaccination campaign
using a linear programming model. Considering constraints on resource availability,
the model aimed to optimize the expected reproduction number by selecting the pro-
portion of people in each household to be vaccinated [19]. In their classic 1982 paper,
Longini and Koopman applied the maximum likelihood principle to fit a statistical
model to symptom related data [20]. More recently, Yang, Longini and Halloran
applied the same methodology to estimate the transmission probabilities and the ef-
ficacy of prophylactic interventions [21]. The authors took data from two trials in
2001 and 2004 using the antiviral drug osteltamivir (also known as Tamiflu). The
paper estimated a reduction in the probability of infection by 85% for exposed cases,
and a reduction in the probability of transmission of 66% for infectious individuals
[21]. Cauchemez et al. used Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling to model the risk of
household-based and community-based infection. The paper concluded that children
were more prone to influenza than adults in 79% of cases, and that they had higher
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risk from community born infection in 76% of cases [22]. In the example papers
above, some models used simulation as a validation mechanism or a tool for deriving
numerical conclusions.
Dynamic compartmental models have mostly focused on describing the natural
history of influenza. Typically, each individual in the population is assigned to a
compartment. However, this model does not address some important aspects of the
disease such as the latency period, or the fact that some infected individuals never
develop symptoms. To model the transitions among compartments, most models use
tools such as Markov chains and differential equations. It is widely accepted that the
Markovian assumption of dependency only on the previous stage is reasonably valid
for modeling influenza like diseases.
Ball and Lyne explored different vaccination policies using three dynamic com-
partmental models: Susceptible, Infected, Recovered (SIR), Susceptible, Infected,
Susceptible (SIS), and Susceptible, Infected, Recovered, Susceptible (SIRS). The three
models represented permanent, non-existent, and temporary immunity, respectively,
after the individual was infected [23]. Most of the dynamic compartmental models
assume homogeneity of the population. Larson attempted to build more heteroge-
neous populations by developing three models that divided the population in the
groups of active/inactive, working/non-working, and changing social distancing and
personal hygienic behavior [24]. While the models increased in their complexity, the
conclusions were still very aggregate.
Arino et al. stated that complex compartmental models can yield similar conclu-
sions as simulation-based models. The authors used nine states of which two were
Susceptible-Latent-(A)Symptomatic-Recovered models, with and without treatment,
respectively. The recovered state was shared, and latent and infected individuals could
obtain or decline medical treatment [25]. The models assumed homogenous popula-
tion in each compartment, and did not include any type of non-pharmaceutical inter-
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vention or consideration of social dynamics. Consequently, the model only emulated
the conclusions of agent-based simulation models in the estimation of pharmaceutical
interventions using antiviral drugs. Atkinson and Wein designed a more complicated
variation of these models in an attempt to quantify the routes of influenza transmis-
sion. Based on previous medical studies, they concluded that aerosol based transmis-
sion (e.g., by sneezing) is the dominant mode of transmitting influenza. However, the
authors also acknowledged that their conclusions were not definitive and other types
of transmission (e.g., through contaminated surfaces) could not be discarded [26].
Mathews et al. argued through historical evidence that after recovering, an in-
dividual can present long-term or short-term immunity. They built a model that,
besides the latent-(non-)infectious and (a)symptomatic stages, included these two
new stages. The authors fitted their model with records from 1918 and 1971 PI
from some remote British territories. They concluded that for individuals that had
been isolated from endemic influenza, PI could be more aggressive due to the lack
of heterosubtypic immunity created by individuals living in societies with endemic
influenza [27]. As it can be concluded from the above examples, some important
observations can be drawn regarding the natural history of influenza using dynamic
compartmental models. However, the complexity of PI outbreaks in a heterogeneous
and dynamic society can not be adequately analyzed by using these types of models.
Because of the complexity of the issues surrounding PI outbreaks, it is highly
challenging to build a purely mathematical model of a heterogeneous population
with diverse social interactions. Simulation models have been used to address these
challenges. Another benefit of simulation models is an explicit consideration of ran-
domness of events. This is done by using random variables. By running a model
several times and modifying the values of some key parameters, sensitivity analysis
can be performed to estimate the confidence intervals for the output variables. Below
we provide a sample of representative simulation-based models.
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Figure 2: Chicago Defined as a Metropolitan Area by Halloran et al [1]
A collaborative network of researchers supported by the National Institute of
General Medical Sciences and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) created the
Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study (MIDAS). Despite the fact MIDAS was not
created exclusively to study PI, three major models [28–30] were developed to study
a set of interventions known as targeted layered containment (TLC). The objective
of TLC is to study the synergetic effects of various interventions, such as targeted use
of antiviral drugs, isolation of infected individuals, quarantine of affected households,
school and workplaces closure, and social distancing. Halloran et al. developed a
cross validation of the MIDAS models using the data of 8.6 million people in the city
of Chicago [1]. For this purpose, the authors partitioned the Chicago Metropolitan
Area by using geographic coordinates, as shown in Figure 2. By doing that, the
authors were able to identify metropolitan regions in a specific geographic context.
However, it can be observed from the map that using square-shaped boundaries may
not be the best approach to define a region.
Ferguson et al. used geographic information systems (GIS) to incorporate demo-
graphic densities obtained from LandScan [31] into an epidemiological model. The
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model incorporated a heterogeneous population of households and three types of
schools and workplaces, distributed randomly according to the population density.
The authors modeled Thailand [10] and the continental U.S. and U.K. [28]. The
assumptions regarding transmission of PI in schools were conservative compared to
similar models. As a result, the conclusions did not emphasize school closures. Fergu-
son et al. developed a force of infection transmission model based on the probability
of getting infected according to the theoretical basic reproduction number (R0). The
authors also presented a comprehensive air travel network for their U.S.-U.K. paper.
However, it was assumed that infected people arrived to the main airports of the
countries at a fixed rate. This assumption made it difficult to assess the conclusions
regarding global outbreaks outside the regions of study.
A typical small U.S. town was modeled by Glass et al. The contact process was
based on the Ferguson et al. model[28], but the authors used fixed and random links
to relate a network of 10,000 individuals and neighborhood contacts. More emphasis
was given to the contact among children and teenagers in two types of schools. As a
result, school closure proved to be the most reliable type of intervention [32]. Another
MIDAS model was created by Germann et al., based on the transmission process
considered by Longini et al. [16]. The model considered 281 million people residing
in the continental U.S. and R0 from 1.6 to 2.4. The paper concluded that it was
important to apply travel restrictions in addition to other interventions which can
help to reduce the spread of the outbreak and gain additional time. However, travel
restrictions by themselves seemed to be not very effective [29].
Wu et al. modeled a single region (Hong Kong City), adding an infectious pre-
symptomatic stage in the incubation period of the natural disease history. As a
result, they concluded that household-based interventions were more important, even
if the compliance level was relatively low. They also suggested an algorithm to im-
plement isolation, quarantine, and antiviral prophylaxis in six different scenarios: no
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interventions; quarantine; quarantine and isolation; quarantine and antiviral drugs;
quarantine, isolation; and antiviral drugs, and quarantine, isolation, antiviral drugs
with contact tracing [33]. Some of the strategies were economically unfeasible because
they required up to 12 doses of antiviral drugs per individual in the population. As
a reference, in 2006 the U.S. stockpile was only five million doses [29].
Historical data from a 2003-2004 influenza outbreak in six North Carolina coun-
ties were used by Cooley et al. to fit an agent-based simulation model with ILI
records from local authorities. The model, which included schools, workplaces, pub-
lic transportation, households, neighborhoods and communities, achieved a strong
fit with historical data [34]. Los Alamos National Lab developed an epidemic sim-
ulation engine called EpiSimS, a discrete agent-based simulator, that was used to
model Southern California with data from the 2000 Census. Mniszewski modeled six
counties in California with a total population of almost 19 million individuals divided
into six million households and almost a million locations, such as business, schools,
shops, and restaurants. Some scenarios of the study, for example, closing school for
up to six months, did not seem to be realistic [13].
Das, Savachkin and Zhu developed a large-scale simulation model for 1.1 million
people distributed in 400,000 households. The model featured a high level of granu-
larity, including hourly schedules for each individual and hour-by-hour interactions to
simulate the contact process. The model included a total of thirteen different types
of community establishments. Pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions
were simulated, and detailed statistics were collected including the cumulative num-
bers of infected and dead, the total cost of medical care, and lost productivity [35].
This model was one of the most detailed simulation found in our review of the aca-
demic literature, but also one of the most demanding in terms of computing resources.
Uribe et al. designed a multi-region testbed for Florida using detailed demographic
and social information for the counties of Hillsborough, Dade, Leon and Duval [36].
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The definition of a metropolitan area using only county data may be inadequate,
because part of the metropolitan population that live outside the county may not be
included (for example, Pinellas County in the case of Tampa or Broward County in the
case of Miami). On the other hand, rural areas of the county may not be so relevant
for simulation purposes. However, the conclusions of their work were not affected by
this issue. The authors were able to demonstrate that the current pro-rata policy
of pharmaceutical distributions of resources among counties was not optimal. The
study designed a simulation-based optimization model to distribute such resources in
a more efficient way, thus decreasing the total cost of the outbreak.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been only a few global PI simulators
developed. The IBM Eclipse group built the Spatio-Temporal Epidemiological Mod-
eler [37]. However, this model is based on a network of regions with completely
homogeneous populations. PI propagated from one region to another only by ground
transportation, in proportion to the length of the common boundaries between ad-
jacent regions. Inside each region, simple dynamic compartmental models like SIR
calculated the number of infected and recovered using differential equations.
Colizza et al. [38] took a different approach by using a global air travel network
[42]. The model connected most of the world cities (2094) with international airports.
However, the population within each city was homogeneous and the outbreak model
followed the SEIR model. Moreover, there was no consideration of the rural area
surrounding each one of the metropolitan areas. A different study showed that a
selected sample of 155 airports including 100 most important cities produced similar
results with less computational load [43]. Table 1 summarizes the above simulation
models.
Academic papers focusing on international collaboration to reduce the impact
of PI are mostly in the form of qualitative studies. A sample of these papers is
shown in Table 2. There exist some studies discussing national and multi-national
12
Table 1: Simulation-Based PI Containment and Mitigation Models
Single region
(SR) /
Author, year Cross re-
gional (CR)
Objective Key features
Ferguson et al,
2005 [10] and Fer-
guson et al, 2006
[28]
SR-
2005(Thailand)
and CR-2006
(US & UK)
Model PI spread
& assess mitigation
strategies
- Use of GIS (Landscan)
- Targeted mass prophylactic use of antiviral
drugs and social distancing
- Heterogeneous among groups, homogeneous
within group
- 85M Thailand, 300M US, 58.1M UK
Glass et al, 2006
[32]
SR (small town
in New Mexico)
Examine role of social
distancing
- Targeted social distancing to mitigate PI
- Fixed, small-scale contact network
- Transmission rule follows exponential distribu-
tion
- Emphasis in children and teenagers
Germann et al,
2006 [29]
SR (US) Assess mitigation
strategies
- Sensitivity analysis on R0 from 1.6 to 2.4
- Artificial 281M individuals from 2000 US cen-
sus data divided in 2000-person commu-
nities
- Long trips modeled after Bureau of Trans-
portation data
Wu et al, 2006
[33]
SR (Hong
Kong)
Test different inter-
vention scenarios
- Natural history includes infectious pre-
symptomatic
- Suggest household-based interventions
- Requires high stocks of anti-viral drugs
Colizza et al,
2007 [38, 39]
CR (global) Model worldwide
spread of a pandemic
with air travel
- Air travel network
- Urban centers
- Compartmental models (SLIR)
- Analysis of antiviral and travel restrictions
Halloran et al,
2008 [1]
SR (Chicago) Cross-validate
targeted lay-
ered containment
models (Fergu-
son/Germann/Eubank)
- Chicago metropolitan area (8.6 million people)
- R0 from 1.9 to 3.0
- Simulate effectiveness of feasible intervention
strategies
Cooley et al, 2007
[34]
SR (NC) Compare real life
pandemic curve
against simulation
- Use of 2003-2004 NC outbreak data
- Use ILI data to estimate model parameters
- Curve fitting exercise
Das, Savachkin
and Zhu, 2008
[40]
SR Mimic stochastic
propagation of PI
- Large-scale model
- Hourly schedules
- Heterogeneous population (1.1 M)
Savachkin et al,
2009 [41]
CR (4 counties,
Fl)
Model PI spread
& assess mitigation
strategies
- Dynamic predictive strategy test bed (4M peo-
ple)
- Optimization model for resource allocation
- Minimize total cost of the outbreak
STEM-
Eclipse,2009
[37]
CR (global) Model PI spread
- Geographic visualization of PI spread
- SIR model
- Only ground travel
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Table 2: Literature on International Collaboration
Author, year Objective Key features
Guimera, 2005 [42] Design an optimal global
airport travel network
- Used in subsequent papers by Colizza and others
Fraser, 2009 [54], Col-
izza, 2009 [61], and Lip-
sitch, 2009 [62]
Estimate the number of in-
fected cases during H1N1
outbreak in Mexico
- Domestic air travel
- Homogeneous population
- SEIR models
- Results varied from 2K to 1.4M
Patel, 2008 [44], Hanvo-
ravong, 2010 [45], Men-
sua, 2009 [46], and
SPPNA, 2007 [47]
Compare national PI pre-
paredness plans (qualita-
tive discussions)
- UK, US, NZ, CAN, AUS
- SE Asia
- Latin America
- North America
Franco, 2009 [51], Gal-
laher, 2009 [52], and
Katz, 2009 [53]
Conduct qualitative analy-
ses of H1N1 2009 outbreak;
recommendations for pre-
paredness
- Accurate outbreak chronology
- Comparison to 1918 outbreak
- Revise international regulations
McDougall, 2008 [48],
Oshitani, 2008 [17],
and Paranthaman,
2008 [49]
Suggest international col-
laboration
- Qualitative discussions
Thompson, 2006 [50] Analyze ethical aspects in
pandemic preparedness
- Qualitative discussion
PI preparedness plans [44–47]. Another set of papers presented arguments in favor of
international collaboration [17, 48, 49]. However, the discussion was centered on ideas
which were not supported by quantitative data. The ethical aspects to consider in
pandemic preparedness were also argued in the literature [50]. In the last two years, a
significant number of papers were published regarding the H1N1/2009 experience [51–
60]. Some of these papers included quantitative analysis, either using data collected
from the outbreak or from simulation models trying to emulate its behavior. However,
the discussion on international collaboration in these papers was limited.
In October of 2006, a committee from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) put a
set of recommendations to enhance the existing pandemic models. The most relevant
recommendations for our research are the following: (i) to develop improved estimates
of model and parameter uncertainty, (ii) to include a broader range of closure options,
(iii) to include costs and benefits of intervention strategies, (iv) to design models that
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will help policy makers establish strategies and policies, (v) to include decision-aid
models that can be linked to surveillance data to provide real-time feedback, (vi) to
consider the possible negative effects of non pharmaceutical interventions, and (vii)
to consider not only the public health benefits, but also the ethical, social, economic
and logistical costs [63].
In addition to the IOM recommendations, our review has identified the following
gaps in the academic literature: (i) there is a lack of comprehensive models for global
spread of pandemic influenza, (ii) there is a lack of models which incorporate realistic
travel networks and heterogeneity of the world regions, and (iii) there exists an im-
portant need to develop models which can quantify the impact of sharing mitigation
resources between countries during global pandemic outbreaks.
The need to develop heterogeneous global pandemic models can be challenging
due to the lack of centralized sources of data. Every country manages its own census
data and publishes information in different formats or even sometimes refuses to share
it with the international community. In this work, we are interested in in modeling
the propagation of an outbreak born in a country with a high level of diversity in
both the economical and social aspects. Mexico is the ideal candidate because: (i) it
has both industrialized cities and extremely undeveloped regions, (ii) it is adjacent to
the United States, (iii) it has a policy of sharing information with the international
community and features a well developed national statistics system, and (iv) it was
the first country to declare the H1N1/2009 outbreak which made apparent the lack
of effective international surveillance and resource sharing policies.
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3. Research Objectives
Our first research objective is to enhance capacity management strategies for
multi-region pandemic surveillance. The global surveillance network has only a lim-
ited number of laboratories, most of them being located in developed countries, to
perform surveillance in large populations. During an outbreak, the number of samples
to process may become extremely large, and hence a capacity management problem
can become a serious issue. To address this challenge, we formulate a capacity opti-
mization model of a single lab surveying several geographical regions. The model can
be extended to consider a network of labs that can share surveillance capacities.
Our second research objective is to estimate the outbreak propagation time from
the onset to a likely pandemic export region, such as an international travel hub. For
this purpose, we have adapted the simulation model developed by Uribe et al. [36]
for the case of Mexico. Our testbed implementation features a set of regions with
comprehensive consideration of social, demographic and economic attributes as well
as a complex travel network that mimics travel patterns within Mexico.
Our third research objective is to examine different U.S. antiviral sharing strategies
during global influenza pandemics. For this purpose, we experimented with differ-
ent levels of surveillance, various non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI) as well as
antiviral stockpiles and prophylaxis and treatment strategies. We developed an em-
pirical relationship to quantify the impact of various U.S. - Mexico resource sharing
strategies under several pandemic detection and response scenarios.
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4. Development of Optimal Capacity Management Strategies for Pan-
demic Influenza Surveillance
Before 2009, PI surveillance systems were focused on the H5N1 virus with em-
phasis on Southeast Asia. Due to the experience with H5N1 outbreaks in developing
countries, U.S. labs were designed to deal with a low transmissibility and high sever-
ity virus. The H1N1/2009 outbreak demonstrated that the U.S. surveillance system
was not prepared to handle a high transmissibility virus. Fortunately, H1N1 was not
as severe as H5N1, but the number of specimens arriving to the labs at the peak of
the outbreak caused significant processing delays. This issue brought attention to a
capacity priority dilemma between diagnosis and surveillance functions of the labs.
In U.S., the main objective of the state labs is surveillance while diagnosis is
mostly a function of the private labs. As the H1N1/2009 outbreak showed, at the
beginning of an outbreak, private labs may not have the necessary materials to per-
form the appropriate tests. As a consequence, medical providers would have to send
their specimens to the state labs for diagnosis confirmation. Even when the private
labs become able to perform the tests, high processing costs or lack of confidence can
result in additional diagnosis workload for the state labs. However, at this point of
the outbreak, the priority should be shifted to surveillance. Normally surveillance is
done using specimens sent by medical sentinel providers. In addition, diagnosis spec-
imens can also contribute to the surveillance of a particular area. During the latest
pandemic, most state labs operated under the “first come, first served” processing
policy. As a result, when the number of specimens to be processed significantly ex-
ceeded the capacity of state labs, the lead time from specimen reception to test result
increased dramatically.
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The most significant capacity bottleneck during the H1N1/2009 outbreak was
surprisingly not due to the processing equipment, but to the pre-processing of the
specimens. Once a day, an unknown number of samples arrived to the lab, which
then were tagged and recorded into the computer system by lab personnel. Little
or no time was allocated for processing planning. Therefore, the “first come, first
served” model made a lot of sense. After that experience, the state labs have been
moving to using online specimen tracking systems. Such systems allow to have an
advanced knowledge of the specimens in transit. However, the labs still lack effective
planning mechanisms that will allow to improve the use of the limited capacity. This
section develops such an optimization tool.
4.1 Single Lab Multi-Region Capacity Management Model
Figure 3 shows a schematic of the single lab multi-region model. We consider
a single lab serving N potential outbreak regions over a surveillance horizon of T
periods. During period r (e.g., one day), region i sends a number of specimen Qir ≥ 0
to the lab. Each region i has a surveillance goal Gi, which is the number of specimens
to process during the entire surveillance horizon. The lab has a finite processing
capacity Cp during each period p. In each period r, when the lab receives a specimen,
it must decide when to process this specimen (immediately or at a later time r ≤ p).
Figure 3: Schematic of the Single Lab Multi-Region Model
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As an example, consider the Hillsborough county of the State of Florida (see figure
4). The county can be partitioned in a number of regions based on the zip codes. For
each one of the regions (zip codes), a surveillance goal can be set, depending on the
population of the region and the population density. The surveillance horizon can be
one week, formed by seven daily periods. When sentinels or medical providers send
specimens to the lab, it will aggregate the specimens by zip code for each period.
For example, the specimens sent from region 3 during day 2 will be denoted Q32.
According to the specimens inventory remaining from the previous days, the available
daily capacity, and the forecasted demand, the objective of our model is to decide
how many specimens to process for both surveillance and diagnosis, for each region,
during each period of the surveillance horizon. The decision criterion is minimization
of the total penalty cost due to untimely surveillance and diagnosis processing.
Figure 4: Hillsborough County with Zip Code Based Clusters
First of all, we need to introduce some notation:
N = number of regions served by the lab;
T = number of periods within the surveillance horizon;
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Cp = total available lab capacity in period p;
Qir = total number of specimens received from region i in period r;
Gi = total surveillance goal for region i over the surveillance horizon (Gi = 0 if
an outbreak has already been detected in region i);
piS = penalty cost per unprocessed surveillance specimen;
piD = penalty cost per unprocessed diagnosis specimen per period.
The decision variables are the following:
Sirp ≥ 0 = number of specimens processed for surveillance of region i in period p
from the specimens received in period r, r ≤ p (Sirp = 0 if an outbreak has already
been detected in region i);
Dirp ≥ 0 = number of specimens processed for diagnosis from region i in period p
from the specimens received in period r, r ≤ p.
The following linear programming model can be built:
Minimize z = piS
N∑
i=1
(Gi −
T∑
r=1
T∑
p=r
Sirp) + piD
N∑
i=1
T∑
r=1
T∑
p=r
(Qir −
p∑
k=r
(Sirk +Dirk))
subject to:
T∑
p=r
(Sirp +Dirp) ≤ Qir, for all i = 1, ..., N , for all r = 1, ..., T (1)
T∑
r=1
T∑
p=r
Sirp ≤ Gi, for all i = 1, ..., N (2)
N∑
i=1
p∑
r=1
(Sirp +Dirp) ≤ Cp, for all p = 1, ..., T (3)
The objective function minimizes the sum of the penalty costs due to untimely
surveillance and diagnosis. The first term is the penalty cost due to unmet surveillance
goals over all unaffected regions. The second term is the total penalty cost associated
with delayed diagnosis of the specimens.
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The problem is subject to the following sets of constrains. Constraints (1) account
for the specimens received from each region during each period. Constraints (2)
assure that the number of processed surveillance specimens cannot exceed the regional
surveillance goal. Constraint (3) is the daily capacity constraint.
4.2 An Illustrative Example
To illustrate the use of the developed model, we considered a single lab monitoring
four regions (i = {1, 2, 3, 4}), with respective weekly surveillance goals G1 = 50,
G2 = 30, G3 = 20, and G4 = 20. The daily capacity of the lab was set to Cp = 60 for
all daily periods. The values of Qir for all regions are shown in Table 3.
To estimate the value of piS, we proceeded as follows. We first selected two time
epochs (days) in the outbreak period, t1 and t2 (t2 > t1), which represented two
alternative days of initiation of mitigation strategies. Then we used the simulation
model described in Chapter 5 to calculate the total outbreak costs for each time
epochs t1 (respective cost c1) and t2 (respective cost c2). The incremental cost (c2−c1)
divided by the difference (t2− t1) was interpreted as the daily penalty cost due to the
detection delay associated with untimely surveillance. Since we were interested in the
cost per unit of surveillance specimen during a surveillance horizon piS, we multiplied
the ratio by the total number of periods (days) in the surveillance horizon divided by
the surveillance goal. Hence, the value of piS was estimated as:
piS =
(c2 − c1)
(t2 − t1) ·
T
G
To estimate the value of piD, we divided the incremental cost (c2 − c1) by the
increment in the number of visits to doctor during the same time period (n2 − n1)
divided by (t2− t1). The resulting expression was used as an estimate of the cost per
unprocessed diagnosis specimen per daily period.
piD =
(c2 − c1)
(n2 − n1) · (d2 − d1)
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To calculate the values of piS and piD, we used the following simulation parameters:
region 14, random seed 23, antiviral stockpile 260,000, antiviral strategy using contact
tracing, and no NPI enforced. The values of t1 and t2 were set to t1 = 10 and
t2 = 30 days. The resulting values of piS and piD were piS = 608, 100 and pid = 967
(c1 = 236, 432, 380, c2 = 444, 923, 837, n1 = 9, 726, n2 = 20, 725, and T = 7).
The solution of the optimization model is shown in Tables 3 and 4. It can be
observed that the model prioritizes the processing of surveillance specimens while
minimizing the delay in processing of diagnosis specimens, subject to available daily
capacity. The result of the model is a specimen processing schedule that can be
implemented by the lab. The optimal solution resulted in the total penalty cost of
$1,229,057. As a comparison, the total penalty cost of the “first come, first served”
policy was $2,445,257.
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Table 3: Results of the Example of Single Lab Model with Four Regions
Receiving Processing Region
Day Day (p) 1 (G1 = 50) 2 (G2 = 30) 3 (G3 = 20) 4 (G4 = 70)∑4
i=1Qi1 = 72 C1 = 60 Q11 = 18 Q21 = 18 Q31 = 18 Q41 = 18
S11p D11p S21p D21p S31p D31p S41p D41p
1 - 18 - 18 - 6 18 -
2 - - - - - - - -
3 - - - - - - - -
1 4 - - - - - - - -
5 - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - - -
7 - - - - 12 - - -∑4
i=1Qi2 = 270 C2 = 60 Q12 = 100 Q22 = 100 Q32 = 30 Q42 = 40
S12p D12p S22p D22p S32p D32p S42p D42p
2 - - - 32 - - 28 -
3 - - 30 - 8 - 12 -
2 4 - 6 - 6 - - - -
5 9 8 - 4 - 4 - -
6 41 - - - - - - -
7 - 14 - 7 - 7 - -∑4
i=1Qi3 = 54 C3 = 60 Q13 = 24 Q23 = 10 Q33 = 10 Q43 = 10
S13p D13p S23p D23p S33p D33p S43p D43p
3 - - - - - - 10 -
4 - 12 - 6 - 6 - -
3 5 - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - - -
7 - - - - - - - -∑4
i=1Qi4 = 54 C4 = 60 Q14 = 24 Q24 = 10 Q34 = 10 Q44 = 10
S14p D14p S24p D24p S34p D34p S44p D44p
4 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6
4 5 - - - - - - - -
6 - - - - - - - -
7 - - - - - - - -∑4
i=1Qi5 = 65 C5 = 60 Q15 = 35 Q25 = 10 Q35 = 10 Q45 = 10
S15p D15p S25p D25p S35p D35p S45p D45p
5 - 9 - 9 - 9 - 8
5 6 - - - - - - - -
7 - - - - - - - -∑4
i=1Qi6 = 49 C6 = 60 Q16 = 19 Q26 = 10 Q36 = 10 Q46 = 10
S16p D16p S26p D26p S36p D36p S46p D46p
6 6 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 4
7 - - - - - - - -∑4
i=1Qi7 = 48 C7 = 60 Q17 = 18 Q27 = 10 Q37 = 10 Q47 = 10
S17p D17p S27p D27p S37p D37p S47p D47p
7 7 - 5 - 5 - 4 2 4
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Table 4: Summary of Single Lab Model Example
Region
Receiving 1 2 3 4
Day G1 = 50 = G2 = 30 = G3 = 20 = G4 = 70 =
7∑
r=1
7∑
p=r
S1rp
7∑
r=1
7∑
p=r
S2rp
7∑
r=1
7∑
p=r
S3rp
7∑
r=1
7∑
p=r
S4rp
1.
4∑
i=1
Qi1 = 72 Q11 = 18 Q21 = 18 Q31 = 18 Q41 = 18
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si1p +Di1p) = 72 S11p D11p S21p D21p S31p D31p S41p D41p
- 18 - 18 12 6 18 -
2.
4∑
i=1
Qi2 = 270 Q12 = 100 Q22 = 100 Q32 = 30 Q42 = 40
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si2p +Di2p) = 216 S12p D12p S22p D22p S32p D32p S42p D42p
50 28 30 49 8 11 40 -
3.
4∑
i=1
Qi3 = 54 Q13 = 24 Q23 = 10 Q33 = 10 Q43 = 10
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si3p +Di3p) = 34 S13p D13p S23p D23p S33p D33p S43p D43p
- 12 - 6 - 6 10 -
4.
4∑
i=1
Qi4 = 54 Q14 = 24 Q24 = 10 Q34 = 10 Q44 = 10
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si4p +Di4p) = 24 S14p D14p S24p D24p S34p D34p S44p D44p
- 6 - 6 - 6 - 6
5.
4∑
i=1
Qi5 = 65 Q15 = 35 Q25 = 10 Q35 = 10 Q45 = 10
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si5p +Di5p) = 35 S15p D15p S25p D25p S35p D35p S45p D45p
- 9 - 9 - 9 - 8
6.
4∑
i=1
Qi6 = 49 Q16 = 19 Q26 = 10 Q36 = 10 Q46 = 10
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si6p +Di6p) = 19 S16p D16p S26p D26p S36p D36p S46p D46p
- 5 - 5 - 5 - 4
7.
4∑
i=1
Qi7 = 48 Q17 = 18 Q27 = 10 Q37 = 10 Q47 = 10
4∑
i=1
7∑
p=r
(Si7p +Di7p) = 20 S17p D17p S27p D27p S37p D37p S47p D47p
- 5 - 5 - 4 2 4
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5. Estimation of the Outbreak Propagation Time from the Onset to a
Likely Pandemic Export Region (Testbed of Mexico)
It is believed that a new strain of PI will likely emerge in a rural area of a devel-
oping country [10]. Such areas typically have high population density and extreme
poverty conditions leading to close and repetitive contact with animal reservoirs. In
addition, such areas lack basic hygienic measures and have inadequate health care in-
frastructure. Because of historic reasons, most of the global surveillance systems and
preparedness programs have concentrated their efforts on monitoring the Southeast
Asia. As a consequence, the emergence of a new virus in rural Mexico in 2009 was
somewhat unexpected. Since the virus was detected by observing changes in vital
statistics and not by surveillance laboratories, the epidemiologists knew very little
about the behavior of the novel virus strain. The result was the overestimation of its
severity and the implementation of strict non-pharmaceutical interventions, causing
significant economic costs. When the virus arrived to the U.S., the surveillance stud-
ies conducted by the CDC in Chicago and Delaware [64] made it possible to estimate
the true potential impact of H1N1/2009. Consequently, the NPI implemented by the
U.S. government were more proportionate to the virus severity.
The H1N1/2009 experience gave an important evidence of the lack of effective
surveillance systems in most developing countries outside the SE Asia region. On the
other hand, it takes six to nine months to develop and produce an effective vaccine in
sufficient quantities to mitigate the impact of a PI outbreak. If the existing surveil-
lance networks can be enhanced, more potentially harmful viruses can be included
in the formulation of annual seasonal vaccines. Furthermore, additional information
on the transmissibility and severity of new virus strains would be available before a
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pandemic outbreak is born. If a new outbreak is detected early in an isolated region,
the travel restrictions and antiviral prophylaxis (normally considered as ineffective
intervention measures) may contain the pandemic at the source. Even if an outbreak
cannot be contained, the possibility of decreasing its pace may give public health offi-
cials additional time for studying the virus, designing adequate containment policies,
and starting production of a vaccine to face a second pandemic wave.
Our literature review has shown that such ideas are still hypothetical. A modeling
environment where these hypotheses can be tested needs to be developed. We selected
Mexico as a testbed for a variety of reasons including its recent pandemic history, its
proximity to the United States, the availability of various types of data, our familiarity
with its socio-economic structure, and the heterogeneity of its regions. It is indeed
difficult to find a world region with some extremely undeveloped regions and high PI
potential so close and so connected to the United States.
5.1 Regional Structure of Mexico
The country of Mexico is administratively divided into 32 states and 2495 mu-
nicipalities (see Figure 5). Most of the economic and demographic data collected by
the Mexican National Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI)
are reported either at the state or at the municipal level. However, from a modeling
perspective, the states can be too large and heterogenous areas, making most of the
modeling assumptions very aggregate and thus impractical. On the other hand, the
municipalities are usually small areas, too numerous in quantity, and often possessing
closely related characteristics with their bordering neighbors. Modeling the country
at the municipal level will unnecessarily increase the model complexity and inevitable
limit its computational feasibility. Therefore, we divided the states into homogeneous
areas by aggregating the municipalities with similar characteristics and common bor-
ders. Such a cluster of municipalities within a state was defined as a region, the
cell-unit used in our simulation.
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Figure 5: Administrative Structure of Mexico
In order to form the regions, we developed the following heuristic. The heuristic
can be particularized to other countries with similar granularity of data. The heuristic
is based on two rules: (i) a region has to be composed by municipalities (splitting
municipalities is not allowed) and (ii) a region has to be completely within the borders
of a state. We also tried to limit the average size of a region to 500,000 people.
The heuristic for region formation is presented below:
I. Set a regional population goal to S.
II. Select a state which has not been clustered. If none available, stop.
III. Start forming a new region
III.a Find an unassigned municipality with the highest population density
in the state and assign it to the new region.
III.b If the region size is smaller than S and if there are unassigned munic-
ipalities in the state then,
III.b.i Add an unassigned municipality with the highest population den-
sity which is adjacent to the last added municipality. Repeat step III.b.
III.b.ii Otherwise, the formation of the region is complete. Go to step III.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the Size of the Regions Using the Developed Heuristic
Figure 6 shows the resulting histogram of the size of the regions applying the
described heuristic. At the end, it was decided to make an exception for the case
of Mexico City and model it as a single region of 19.25 million people. Without
considering Mexico City, the regional population size averaged 600,234 individuals
with a median of 548,794, a standard deviation of 365,611, a minimum value of
54,792 and a maximum value of 2,145,452. The procedure resulted in a total of 154
regions plus Mexico City (see Figure 7).
INEGI reports the data on demographics, household distributions, health services,
and school systems at the state level [65], while workplaces and population size are
reported at the municipal level [66]. Consequently, certain levels of (des)aggregation
were needed to organize the data for each of the regions. To this end, it was necessary
to filter, query, and merge data from several databases using SQL. The original format
of the raw data was converted to the format shown in Appendix C.
At the end of this section, we can note from our experience that the main obstacle
that modelers may face when developing systems like the one we are describing will
likely be the lack of a universal data format followed by all countries in the way they
report demographic, economic, transportation, and healthcare related information.
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Figure 7: Mexico Partitioned into 155 Regions
5.2 Likely Pandemic Export Regions
Table 5 suggests that once an outbreak has started in Mexico, it is very probable
that it would be exported abroad by a foreign visitor rather than a Mexico resident
[65]. Because of this consideration, a certain number of regions would more likely be
responsible for pandemic export. These regions, called likely pandemic export (LPE)
regions, include major transportation hubs and the regions with a common border
with the U.S. (see Table 6 and Figure 8). It can also be noted from Figure 8 that the
United States attracts 77% of all Mexican abroad travel [67].
Table 5: International Travel to/from Mexico
Total visits (2008): 26.2 M
Foreign travelers 21.6 M (82.5%)
Tourists 10.5 M (40.0%)
Cruises/sea commerce 8.1 M (31.0%)
Business/others 3.0 M (11.5%)
Mexicans 4.6 M (17.5%)
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Table 6: Areas of Mexico with Major International Transportation Hubs
Area [number of regions] Travelers
Quintana Roo (Cancun) [1] 9.1 M (35%)
Mexico City [1] 5.0 M (19%)
Jalisco (Guadalajara, Puerto Vallarta) [2] 3.0 M (11%)
Baja California Sur (Los Cabos) [1] 2.3 M (8.5%)
Border States (6 States) [14] 2.8 M (11%)
By analyzing the recent pandemic history, it can be expected that a PI outbreak is
very likely to originate from an isolated and economically underdeveloped rural area.
At the outbreak onset, the probability of an immediate global spread is small because
of the geographic isolation of the region. It is when the outbreak reaches one of the
LPE regions shown in Figure 8 that the probability of a global outbreak substantially
increases. Then the following questions arise: (i) How long does it take from the onset
of the outbreak until it reaches one of the LPE regions? (ii) Is it possible to contain
or slow down a global outbreak if the virus is promptly detected in the originating
areas? (iii) What mitigation resources are needed to achieve these goals? (iv) What
type of surveillance system is required for a timely pandemic detection? (v) Would
developed countries, namely the U.S., be willing to share the required resources to
avoid or mitigate global outbreaks?
To the best of our knowledge, it is not possible to answer the above questions with
the existing models. It is therefore the main motivation of our work to try answering
these questions to the best of our ability.
5.3 Designation of Economically Undeveloped Regions
In order to determine economically undeveloped regions, we have used the data on
the social security coverage rather than the unemployment rate. The reason for that
is due to the fact that because of its traditional definition in the economic sciences,
some of the economically undeveloped states can have a relatively low unemployment
rate [68]. There are two major public health institutions in Mexico which provide
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Figure 8: Likely Pandemic Export Regions in Mexico
medical insurance to workers, their economic dependents, and retirees. These insti-
tutions are the Mexican Institute of Social Security (IMSS) with 49.1 M beneficiaries
and the Institute of Security and Social Services of State Workers (ISSSTE) with
11.1 M people covered [69]. For an employed Mexican resident, it is mandatory to
pay insurance premiums to one the above institutions. Consequently, the residents
without a formal job are not covered by these organizations. Both IMSS and ISSSTE
report state level statistics in the form of the ratio of insured population to the to-
tal population of the state. In our testbed, we selected economically undeveloped
regions from the states with the ratio less than or equal to 0.5. As a result, we have
selected 69 potential outbreak starting regions in the following states: Chiapas (the
ratio is 0.25), Oaxaca (0.31), Puebla (0.36), Tlaxcala (0.38), Me´xico (0.38), Guerrero
(0.39), Hidalgo (0.41), Tabasco (0.42), Veracruz1 (0.42), Michoaca´n (0.45), and More-
los (0.49). It can be observed from Figure 9 that the economic undeveloped regions
are mostly concentrated in the central and southern part of the country.
1The first cases of the H1N1/2009 were reported in the Mexican state of Veracruz [54].
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Figure 9: Economically Underdeveloped Regions and LPE Regions in Mexico
5.4 Multi-Region Travel Network
Most papers on modeling global spread have used air travel as the only mode
of transportation for the population under study [28, 38, 43]. However, as it can
be seen from Table 7, a travel model for Mexico needs to take into consideration
the land transportation because it accounts for 97.7% of the domestic travel volume
[70]. On the other hand, air transportation accounts for only 1.6%. However, air
transportation will likely play a key role in potential export of a PI outbreak.
Table 7: Distribution of Domestic Travel by Transportation Mode
Transport Type Percentage
Highways 97.7%
Air 1.6%
Railroads 0.3%
Sea 0.4%
In order to determine the inter-regional travel probabilities, we adopted a database
that listed the geographic location and aggregated demographic information of 4,400
urban areas of Mexico [71]. For the purposes of our model, we selected the largest
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urban areas/cities which were most representative of each of the 155 regions discussed
in Section A. A total of 164 cities were selected (they are represented by green dots
were selected which are in Figure 10, left).
One of the biggest challenges we have encountered was to connect the selected
cities in a way that would mimic the land transportation network of the country.
Data from the three largest bus companies in the country were obtained from their
web pages [72–74]. With that information and the data obtained from the Mexican
Institute of Transportation [67], we estimated the traffic volume between the regions
by using the daily number of buses that cruised between the respective cities of the
regions (see Figure 10, right). Using these data, we obtained an origin/destination
traffic volume matrix which was transformed into a 155x155 matrix of inter-regional
travel probabilities.
Figure 10: A Schematic of Inter-Regional Traffic Volume Network
According to the Mexican Institute of Transportation, the probability of a Mexican
resident traveling outside his community is 8% on any given day [70]. However, it
should be noted that in that study communities are defined as areas located in close
geographic proximity. As a consequence, the above probability would also include
internal travel within our testbed regions and thus should only be used as an upper
bound. Longini et al. used a daily travel probability of 1% in the case of Thailand
[16]; this value was also used in our model.
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5.5 Multi-Region Pandemic Simulation Model
Appendix B shows a schematic of the multi-regional simulation model developed
by Das et al. [35]. The agent-based simulation model mimics the detailed social and
disease dynamics, featuring hourly schedules of regions inhabitants while they work
or attend school, run errands, attend leisure activities, or stay at home with their
families. The simulation was developed in C following an object-oriented program-
ming style. In the following paragraphs, we will explain the main functions of each
object or subprograms to give the reader a better understanding of the simulation
structure. This simulation has been published in the academic literature [35, 75].
The object Main controls the simulation. Main declares all the constants and calls
the following objects in a sequential order: Read Input, Initialize, Ongoing Region,
Cost, Daily Statistics, and Reproduction Number. The first two objects are called once
at the beginning of the simulation, whereas the others are called on a periodic (daily
or hourly) basis. Main also determines the maximum duration of the simulation and
records the daily statistics in the respective output files.
Read Input reads a set of input files and assign values to most simulation variables.
Since every region has different demographics, different data is needed to capture the
heterogeneity of the regions. Appendix C lists the different read files and their struc-
ture. Read Input opens each one of the files, declares arrays of appropriate sizes,
writes the input data into the arrays, and closes the input files. Most of the con-
stants are declared within the main simulation program. However, if they need to be
modified, constants.txt is the input file that contains their values. Additionally, con-
stants.txt indicates which region need to be simulated and which random replication
seed will be used. When an experiment is designed, different simulation versions will
use different versions of the constants.txt file.
After calling Read Input, Main calls Initialize. Initialize creates an array of re-
gional variables that will be updated during the simulation, and then calls Generate
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Businesses and Generate Entities. Generate Businesses creates a set of business
structures to designate workplaces of individuals. Additionally, the object also de-
clares mixing groups within businesses structures of the region. Generate Entities
creates individual (human) entities, assigning them a particular household. In addi-
tion, each individual is assigned a set of attributes that will be tracked and updated
during the simulation. After creating an adult entity, the simulation calls Adult
Age Workplace, whereas after creating a child entity Children Age School is called.
These objects assign adults and children to their respective workplaces/schools, mix-
ing groups, and after-school activities.
Once the regional community has been generated, Main calls Ongoing Region. Af-
ter initializing the vector value of daily statistics, it checks if the outbreak has started
in the region, and then calls Generate Outbreak. Generate Outbreak randomly se-
lects a pre-defined number of initial infected individuals from the regional population
and starts their disease clock. After that, Ongoing Region checks the status of NPI
in the region and calls the appropriate scheduling object. Schedules are created on
an hourly basis so that each individual is situated in a particular establishment at
any moment during the simulation. Then Disease Progress, Tracking Individuals,
Household Spread, Hourly Contact, and Visit Doctor objects are called every hour.
Disease Progress monitors all infected individuals within a region. Every hour,
the disease clock of each infected individual is updated until a culmination period is
reached. At this point, the individual either recovers or dies with some probability.
Recover Process records the statistics of the recovered individuals by age in the output
files. Recovered individuals develop full immunity. Disease Progress also calculates
the mortality probability based on the age based mortality probability and status of
antiviral treatment. Death Process collects the statistics of the deceased individuals.
Every business entity in the simulation is divided into mixing groups, allowing
individuals to have a closer interaction with others in their respective mixing group.
35
Tracking Individuals creates two tracking arrays within a mixing group, one for sus-
ceptible individuals and one for infected individuals. Every time an individual is
infected, he is moved from the susceptible array to the infected array. When an in-
dividual dies, he is removed from the respective mixing group. When an individual
recovers, he remains in the mixing group, but is removed from the susceptible and in-
fected arrays. Tracking Individuals also counts the number of susceptible households
at any point during the simulation.
Household Spread tracks the contacts among susceptible and infected individuals
within each household. Each hour, the object checks who is present in the household
and creates random (uniform) contacts. For any new contacts, Household Spread calls
Infection. Hourly Contact is the analogous object for businesses. It checks the contact
among infected and susceptible individuals within mixing groups. Contact rates vary
with business type. Household Spread and Hourly Contact calculate duration of
contact ∆t for each contact event. Infection calculates the probability of infection for
each susceptible contact. Visit Doctor handles the individuals who are looking for
medical assistance. Additionally, it administers antiviral drugs according to a preset
policy, and declares social distancing strategies (individual, household, workplace, or
community based).
At the end of each day, the main program checks if there are N infectious travelers
in any of the unaffected regions. If so, the program starts running the new outbreak(s)
in parallel with the rest of the ongoing outbreaks. This process is sketched in Figure
11. The main simulation ends when an outbreak reaches a likely export region, or if
the outbreak is contained no more infected individuals are generated before reaching
such a region. The maximum simulation duration was set to 600 days.
Three additional objects are called to calculate the daily statistics. Cost computes
the cost due to deaths, hospitalized individuals, and loss of productivity. While it is
difficult and polemic to attempt translating human life into money, it is nevertheless
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Figure 11: A Schematic of a Regional Outbreak Generation
necessary to have a common unit to measure the aggregated impact of death, loss of
productivity, and medical expenses. Besides, we only used the cost criterion to com-
pare different simulation scenarios. Daily Statistics records daily information in the
output files SummaryRegion.txt and ContactProcess.txt, while Reproduction Number
takes care of the statistics by generation of infected in the file ReproductionNumber.txt.
The content of these output files is listed in Appendix C.
5.6 Automated Replication Interface
Our multi-region simulation model is programmed in C. Because it was required
to run the model thousands of times with different parameters, we developed an
automated replication program using Visual Basic Applications (VBA). We used MS
Access to define an experiment as a table. Such an experiment is composed of several
simulations, all of them with different parameters. A client computer inquires the
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database for any simulations to be run, in which case the VBA program creates
the input files with the parameters taken from the table. Every client computer is
connected to the server and independently runs the simulations and generates the
output files. When the simulations finish, the VBA program reads and records the
output files in the central database. Using the database, a comprehensive repository
of results is created in MS Access, which can be organized and presented according to
the needs of a decision maker. For more advanced statistical analysis, we used SQL
to export a particular dataset to the SAS statistical software.
The automated replication program allows the end user to: (i) manage an exper-
imental design of multiple scenarios, (ii) run automatically every simulation within a
scenario, and (iii) create a repository of the results obtained from each simulation. We
created a Scenario Manager using MS Access as the main tool to implement function
(iii) and the VBA program to implement functions (i) and (ii) (see Appendix D).
Since all information obtained through the output files is read and stored in Sce-
nario Manager, generic reports and graphs can be designed for each simulation and
scenario. Figure 12 shows an example of the type of graphs that can be easily created.
In this particular example, an outbreak starts in region 71 on day 1. On approxi-
mately day 35, two outbreaks start in regions 77 and 110, respectively. By day 75,
the outbreak in the original region has reached its peak, but it is in an increasing
stage in the other two regions. Another outbreak starts in region 30 around day 79.
At day 86, an outbreak starts in region 96, a likely pandemic export region. At this
point, the simulation ends.
5.7 Classification of Regions for Calibration Purposes
Mexico is a country with a very strong economic stratification, including one of
the largest cities in the world with around 20 million people, some very industrialized
and developed urban centers, small towns supported by family-owned businesses,
tourist resorts with large hotels and casinos, and isolated rural areas where more
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Figure 12: Example of a Graph Showing the Regional Daily Infection Rate
than 40 million people live under the conditions of extreme poverty. According to the
census data, 95% of the Mexican companies have 5 employees or less [66]. However,
the presence of large companies in certain regions may affect the way disease spreads.
Because of this heterogeneity, in order to calibrate our simulation model, we classified
all 155 regions into four quadrants, as shown in Figure 13. The x-axis presents
the percentage of industrial businesses in the region, while the y-axis represents the
average company size. The quadrants are divided by the mean value of each one of
these variables. Detailed information for each region is presented in Appendix A.
5.8 Calibration of the Simulation Model
To calibrate our simulations for each quadrant, we used the disease strength pa-
rameter ρ. It has been observed from preliminary analysis that when using low values
of ρ, a regional outbreak could be initiated and sustained using certain random seeds,
but not the other seeds. A total of more than two thousand simulations were run
to find the minimum value of ρ that would guarantee a sustained outbreak in each
region. The details of the calibration results are presented in Appendix E. Table 8
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Figure 13: Regions Classified by Company Size and Percentage of Industries
summarizes the minimum values of ρ obtained from the calibration process and the
percentages of the regions where an outbreak was able to be initiated and sustained.
5.9 The Outbreak Lead Time from the Onset to a LPE Region
To create a baseline scenario, we used the travel probability of 1%, as in Longini et
al. [16]. We also adapted key parameters from Ferguson [28], such as a 27% initially
immune population, 10 seed infectious to start a regional outbreak, and the value
of ρ = 1575, to guarantee that an outbreak is started and sustained in any region,
independently of the selected replication seed. We also used N=10 as the minimum
number of infectious travelers in a region to declare an outbreak in the region.
We designed a preliminary experiment to estimate the impact of both the number
of travelers to start an outbreak and the travel probability on the outbreak lead time.
As initial regions, we used the sixty nine economically undeveloped regions defined
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Table 8: Summary of Calibration Values of ρ
Number of Cumulative Cumulative
Minimum Regions with % of Regions Total Population
value Sustained with Sustained Population Size
of ρ Outbreaks Outbreaks Size (% of Individuals)
975 1 0.6% 456,488 0.5%
1025 1 1.3% 718,103 1.3%
1100 53 35.7% 27’869,746 33.3%
1175 46 65.6% 27’520,549 64.9%
1250 23 80.5% 16’521,772 83.9%
1325 20 93.5% 8’578,487 93.8%
1375 6 97.4% 3’230,871 97.5%
1575 4 100.0% 2’195,718 100.0%
earlier in Section V.B (see Appendix C). We ran each initial region, one at a time,
with the values of the travel probability 0.5% and 1%, and the number of travelers
to start an outbreak of 5 and 10, with a total of 276 simulations. Table 9 shows the
average lead time (in days) and the number of times each LPE region was reached.
From the table, it can be observed that in 84% of the time, the LPE region reached
was a major city, either Mexico City (65%) or Guadalajara (19%). The U.S. border
regions were reached in only 11% of the time, and the tourist regions were reached
only 5% of the time. Only 11 out of 19 LPE regions were reached. The rest of the
regions (65, 117, 120, 137, 138, 142, and 151) are underpopulated regions in widely
arid areas, and region 149 (La Paz/Los Cabos) is geographically isolated from the
rest of the country because of its location in the Baja California peninsula. Table 9
also shows that both the travel probability and the number of individuals to start an
outbreak can affect the lead time. A more detailed analysis of the effect of these and
other parameters on the lead time is developed in the next chapter.
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Table 9: Summary of the Results for the Baseline Scenario
Average Lead Time in Days
(# Times Reached)
Likely Pandemic Travel # Individuals to Start an Outbreak
Export Region Probability 5 10
79. Ciudad de Me´xico, D.F. 0.5% 44.81 (44) 55.32 (46)
1% 41.53 (45) 46.59 (44)
96. Guadalajara, Jalisco 0.5% 55.83 (12) 70.42 (14)
1% 45.25 (12) 57.8 (15)
39. Cancu´n, Quintana Roo 0.5% 60.25 (4) 70 (2)
1% 54 (4) 62.5 (2)
152. Mexicali, Baja California 0.5% 55.5 (4) -
1% 38.5 (2) 54.67 (3)
22. Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas 0.5% 37 (1) 46 (1)
1% 47.5 (2) 55 (2)
21. Reynosa, Tamaulipas 0.5% 55 (2) 41 (1)
1% 28.5 (2) -
150. Tijuana, Baja California 0.5% 48 (1) -
1% 43 (1) 59.5 (2)
29. Nogales, Sonora 0.5% 52 (1) -
1% 41 (1) 49 (1)
18. Matamoros, Tamaulipas 0.5% 44 (1) -
1% - 47 (1)
95. Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco 1% 31 (1) 41 (1)
121. Cd. Jua´rez, Chihuahua 1% - 65 (1)
42
6. U.S. Resource Sharing Strategies During Global Influenza Pandemics
6.1. Mitigation Resources and International Collaboration
In Chapter 1, we discussed the importance of international collaboration to en-
hance the U.S. preparedness for a global pandemic outbreak. However, at present
there exist no studies which can quantify the impact of collaboration, particularly
resource sharing. Assigning too few resources to an international partner may not
be enough to enhance our preparedness. On the other hand, sharing too many re-
sources may be a costly enterprise which can undermine domestic preparedness and
response. An adequate strategy would be the one that can increase the safety level of
all involved countries by reducing the number of affected regions, increasing the lead
time to allow manufacturers to produce more antiviral drugs and develop a potent
vaccine, or even possibly containing the outbreak at the source. We explore diverse
resource sharing strategies in this chapter.
Every resource sharing strategy has a probability of success and a cost and the
decision makers have to balance these two factors. Our work attempts to provide
public health officials with a decision aid model aimed at improving the existing ad-
hoc resource sharing strategies during global influenza pandemics. In what follows,
we discuss both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical resources that can be shared
with a country of pandemic origin.
Assuming the outbreak is caused by a novel virus strain, the only pharmaceuti-
cal mitigation resource available at early pandemic stages would be antiviral drugs.
Currently, antiviral drugs are available in most pharmacies with a physician’s pre-
scription. However, a massive pharmaceutical prophylaxis will require substantial
stockpiles and advanced distribution logistics. In this work, we are considering two
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main factors that may affect the effect of antiviral-based intervention: antiviral dis-
tribution strategy and antiviral stockpile.
We consider three different antiviral distribution strategies. The first strategy
prescribes antivirals to every symptomatic individual who visits a doctor. It can be
noted that during the H1N1/2009 outbreak, the Mexican government was conservative
about the use of antivirals and only provided them to the patients whose life was
considered to be at risk. A risk adverse decision maker may adopt such a strategy in
an attempt to avoid mutation of the virus into an antiviral-resistant strain. However,
we will adopt a risk-neutral strategy and provide a complete treatment to every
individual visiting a doctor. Our second strategy is based on contact tracing. In
this case, not only the symptomatic individual receives the antiviral course, but also
his/her household members as well as the members of his/her workplace mixing group.
Because antivirals reduce the capability of the virus to reproduce in the human body,
such a strategy may reduce both the infectiousness of infected cases and the exposure
of uninfected individuals. Our third strategy attempts to provide antivirals to the
entire regional population. We call this strategy ‘blanket’ since it attempts to cover
an entire geographic region. In all strategies, the application of antiviral drugs was
paced according to the available distribution capacity. Such a gradual distribution
was particularly important for implementing the blanket strategy.
To implement an antiviral strategy it is necessary to have an adequate antiviral
stockpile. Some of the above strategies require more courses than others, which may
require the use of shared quantities. In this work, we studied how different levels of
antiviral stockpile impact the effectiveness of a antiviral strategies.
We also consider certain non-pharmaceutical interventions which can be used by
the Mexican authorities. During an outbreak, officials may decide to totally or par-
tially close schools and workplaces and/or ban or limit public gatherings in places
like theaters, stadiums, and churches. In 2009, the Mexican government was strict in
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implementing non-pharmaceutical strategies, declaring closures of schools, non-vital
workplaces, and banning social gathering for several weeks. These measures were im-
plemented nationwide, even in unaffected regions. In our study, we only considered
two scenarios when either most comprehensive, all inclusive NPI were implemented
or when no NPI were used. By doing so, we sought to understand the isolated effect
of non-pharmaceutical interventions on the outbreak lead time.
A variable that indirectly measures the efficiency of a surveillance system is what
we called the detection delay. A sophisticated surveillance system is costly, but
it can assure a fast detection and prompt intervention (pharmaceutical and non-
pharmaceutical), while a nonexisting or inefficient surveillance system may reduce
the intervention effectiveness because the outbreak has already spread to several re-
gions. It can be noted that in the case of H1N1/2009, the outbreak was detected
through vital statistics which showed an increase in the number of deaths due to
respiratory diseases in certain regions. In this case, several weeks had elapsed from
the onset of the outbreak until the emergency was declared.
From the perspective of a U.S. decision maker, understanding how the above fac-
tors affect the lead time of an overseas-born outbreak can be of significant importance.
Knowing which factors and their levels are more relevant can aid in developing intel-
ligent resource sharing strategies. The following analysis aims to achieve this goal.
6.2 Design of Experiment for the Outbreak Lead Time
After identifying the factors that can impact the outbreak lead time, we designed
an experiment to quantify the impact through an empirical relationship. Table 10
summarizes the design of experiment. We selected six initial outbreak regions from
different parts of the country with diverse population strata and economic devel-
opment. The economic development was reflected in the quadrant of the region.
Economically undeveloped regions tend to be located in quadrants 1 and 2, while
heavily industrialized regions tend to be situated in quadrants 3 and 4. We selected
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three levels of antiviral stockpiles: zero (none), a relatively small stockpile (260K),
and a stockpile large enough to cover the entire population of the initial region and
some more, if needed (2M). The stockpile was measured in terms of courses of doses.
We used the three types of antiviral distribution strategies and the two types of non-
pharmaceutical interventions described in the previous section. Finally, we used three
levels of detection delay (1, 10, and 30 days) and three levels of N , the number of
infectious individuals required to start a regional outbreak (N = 3, 6, and 10).
Table 10: Design of Experiment: Factors and Levels
Factor Definition # of Levels Level Values
- Region ID N/A 71 130 14 36 32 145
Q Region quadrant 4 1 1 2 2 3 4
P Population (in thousands) 6 931 195 482 646 620 378
N Number of infectious 3 3
individuals required to 6
start a regional outbreak 10
AS Antiviral stockpile, 3 0
courses 260,000
2,000,000
AD Antiviral distribution 3 Treatment of visits to doctor (1)
strategy Contact tracing treatment (2)
Blanket prophylaxis (3)
NPI Level of NPI 2 None (0)
Comprehensive (1)
D Detection delay, 3 1
days 10
30
Figure 14 (top) illustrates the selected initial outbreak regions: four regions from
quadrants 1 and 2, and two regions from quadrants 3 and 4, respectively. The regions
also represented diverse geographic areas of the country (See Figure 14 (bottom)).
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Figure 14: Regions Selected for the Design of Experiment
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6.3 Empirical Relationship for the Outbreak Lead Time
We executed a total of 2,250 replicates using all possible combinations of the
factor levels with three random replication seeds. The dependent variable was the
outbreak lead time, defined as the number of days since the onset of the outbreak
until it reaches a LPE region. We used SAS v.9.2 for the statistical analysis. The
first statistical analysis we performed was a set of normality tests (see Appendix H).
To study the effect of the interactions among the factors, we used a regression
model with the main factors and their second and third order interactions. We ob-
tained a value of R2 = 0.7158. However, some of the factor interactions were not
significant. We eliminate from the model factor interactions with p − values ≥ 0.05
and ended up with a value of R2 = 0.7028 and the average lead time of 304.68 days.
Table 11 shows the resulting regression model with only significant factors. As
an example of using the regression model, consider the following factor values: a
region with population of 650K, located in quadrant 1, an antiviral stockpile of 700K
courses, antiviral treatment of visits to doctor, no NPI, a detection delay of 10 days,
and N = 6. Based on the regression model, the outbreak lead time will be 35.94 days.
We also conducted ANOVA with Tukey tests to determine significant statistical
difference in the factor levels. Table 12 summarizes which levels of each factor were
found to be statistically different at the 0.05 level. Based on this table, a decision
maker can conclude that for instance, blanket prophylaxis and contact tracing based
treatment are expected to have similar effect on the outbreak lead time. On the other
hand, the expected effect will be rather different for a 10-day and a 30-day detection
delay as well as for the initial regions located in quadrants 1 and 3, respectively.
Table 13 shows the strategies that contained the outbreak at the source. Most
of the strategies required the use of comprehensive NPI. It can also be observed
that the blanket strategy was the most efficient of all antiviral distribution strate-
gies. However, it did not prove to be statistically different than a combination of
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Table 11: Regression Model for the Outbreak Lead Time
Factor Coefficient p-value
Intercept -149.08 0.0001
P 0.0001178 0.0016
N 10.5057564 0.0003
AS -0.0000669 < 0.0001
NPI 115.3587827 0.0017
D 8.7207832 < 0.0001
Q · AD 35.9602963 < 0.0001
Q ·NPI -120.3634501 < 0.0001
Q ·D -2.2014098 0.0006
P · AD 0.0000944 0.0019
P ·NPI -0.0003678 < 0.0001
P ·D -0.0000111 0.0001
N · AD 8.2419937 < 0.0001
N ·D -0.7762634 0.0002
AS · AD 0.0001019 < 0.0001
AS ·NPI 0.0001491 < 0.0001
AD ·NPI 103.352587 < 0.0001
AD ·D -3.5162046 < 0.0001
NPI ·D -4.2564074 0.0003
Q · P · AD -0.0000824 < 0.0001
Q · P ·NPI 0.000318 < 0.0001
Q · P ·D 0.0000048 0.0004
P ·N · AD -0.0000158 < 0.0001
P ·N ·NPI 0.0000167 < 0.0001
P ·N ·D 0.0000012 0.0003
N · AS ·NPI -0.0000045 0.0085
N · AS ·D 0.0000003 < 0.0001
AS · AD ·NPI -0.0001031 < 0.0001
AS · AD ·D -0.0000017 < 0.0001
AD ·NPI ·D 4.8207876 < 0.0001
Q = region quadrant; P = population; N = number of infectious individuals required to start a
regional outbreak; AS = antiviral stockpile; AD = antiviral distribution strategy; NPI = level of
non-pharmaceutical interventions; D = detection delay.
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Table 12: Factor Levels Grouped by Significance
Factor Definition Significant Levels
Q Region quadrant {1, 2}, {3}, {4}
P Population (in thousands) {195, 378}, {482}, {620, 646}, {931}
N Number of infectious {3}, {6}, {10}
individuals required
to start a regional outbreak
AS Antiviral stockpile, {0}, {260,000}, {2,000,000}
courses
AD Antiviral distribution {Treatment of visits to doctor},
strategy {Contact tracing treatment,
Blanket prophylaxis}
NPI Level of non-pharmaceutical {None},
interventions {Comprehensive}
D Detection delay, {1}, {10}, {30}
days
contact tracing based treatment with comprehensive NPI. This result is important
because the blanket distribution is expensive, very challenging logistically, and may
increase the antiviral immunity of the virus. On the other hand, contact tracing based
treatment implemented within 10 days of the pandemic detection and accompanied
by comprehensive NPI appeared to have the same effect as the blanket policy but
without any of the above disadvantages.
Table 13: Strategies Resulted in Outbreak Containment at the Source
AS AD NPI D
Treatment Contact
Initial of doctor tracing Blanket
Outbreak 0 260K 2M visits treatment Prophylaxis 0 1 1 10 30
* * * *
* * * *
All regions * * * *
* * * *
* * * *
* * * *
All regions * * * *
but the largest * * * *
(in addition to * * * *
the above) * * * *
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The detection delay appeared to have a significant impact on the outbreak lead
time. Outbreak containment at the source was possible for both a 1-day and a 10-day
delay. This can suggest that a surveillance system does not have to be perfect to be
effective. However, a 30-day delay led to a significant decrease in the lead time.
The number of infectious individuals required to start a regional outbreak, N , had
a proportionate effect on the outbreak lead time. In our experience, setting this value
too low may increase the noise in the simulation results, since some travelers may
have limited social interaction in the destination regions. It appears that the effect of
this variable on the lead time was approximately linear in the range between N = 3
and N = 10. However, this variable did not affect the set of strategies which led to
outbreak containment at the source.
Appendix I shows a histogram of the lead time eliminating those simulations when
an outbreak was contained at the source. The effect of all strategies in containing the
outbreak at the source is presented in Appendix J.
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7. Summary of Main Results, Contributions and Future Research
This dissertation presented three related models to aid decision makers to analyze
resource sharing strategies during global influenza pandemics. The first model devel-
oped optimal capacity management strategies for a single lab to enhance multi-region
pandemic surveillance. As it was shown in the later chapters, the detection delay
could have a significant impact on the effectiveness of any resource sharing strategy.
The second model estimated the outbreak lead time from the onset to a likely pan-
demic export region, such as a major transportation hub. The model served as the
foundation for addressing the main objective of this dissertation. Substantial efforts
were put to achieve accurate data support and computational feasibility of the model.
The third model developed an empirical relationship to quantify the impact of var-
ious antiviral sharing strategies on the outbreak lead time under several pandemic
detection and response scenarios.
7.1 Summary of the Main Results
Our study supports the claim that it is possible to contain an outbreak at the
source. Table 13 lists different strategies to achieve this goal. In the majority of
cases, the source containment was not possible without sharing of antivirals (2M
courses). Both the blanket antiviral prophylaxis and the less costly contact tracing
based treatment achieved at-source containment, but only when combined with a
comprehensive NPI strategy and a prompt outbreak detection (within 10 days). Nei-
ther antiviral treatment of visits to doctor nor using only comprehensive NPI could
achieve at-source containment.
In the worst case scenario, with no interventions, the 95% confidence interval for
the mean outbreak lead time was [43.2, 47.6] days. Using only comprehensive NPI
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without antivirals yielded the confidence interval of [163.8, 207.2] days with at-source
containment achieved in only 5% of the time. In the most optimistic scenario of imple-
menting both comprehensive non-pharmaceutical interventions and blanket/contact
tracing based antiviral strategies (with 2M courses), with a prompt detection (within
10 days), the corresponding confidence interval was [580.6, 600.0] days with at-source
containment achieved in 98% of the time.
The impact of the factors on the outbreak lead time was nonlinear and complex
with some factors and interactions being more influential than others. All of the
factors considered in the design of experiment were found to be significant, either
by themselves or through factor interactions. In all cases, outbreak containment was
achieved at the source while none was achieved in transit to a LPE region.
Mexico and Guadalajara were the most recurrent LPE regions with approximately
80% of all pandemic paths ending in these two major cities. It can be suggested that
these regions need special PI surveillance once an outbreak is detected, particularly
at the airports and bus stations. From the standpoint of Mexico partners, it can
also be suggested that restricting incoming travel from the above regions may be a
more appealing option than banning the air traffic from the entire country. It was
found that touristic LPE regions were among the least affected LPE regions unless
an outbreak started in a nearby area. Not all regions of the country were equally
affected by pandemic. The areas on the intersection of major highways were among
the most affected and thus requiring higher surveillance, whereas the areas with low
population density (such as deserts in the northern part of the country) seemed to be
less impacted and hence needing less surveillance.
The propagation of a PI outbreak was highly correlated with the transportation
network and the regional demographics. It was observed in some isolated cases that
small and less connected regions could contain the outbreak without interventions.
While eventually the virus may escape such small isolated regions, with adequate
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surveillance, public health officials would be able to develop a potent vaccine to
protect the rest of the country population.
To enhance the U.S. preparedness and response, it is necessary to assist the de-
veloping countries to establish adequate surveillance systems. We have shown that
these systems do not have to be perfect to be effective, and that sampling of specimens
should be distributed differently among the regions. For surveillance to be effective,
it needs to focus on economically undeveloped areas, regions with high connectivity,
and likely pandemic export regions.
7.2 Main Contributions
Our work is one of the first decision models for a quantitative assessment of re-
source sharing strategies during global pandemic scenarios. We have developed an
empirical relationship for the outbreak lead time. Our results demonstrate the im-
portance of considering both the regional heterogeneity and comprehensive travel
networks in pandemic models. Our research is also an initial attempt to develop a
detailed simulation of pandemic spread and mitigation strategies in Mexico. Such
a study is important because of the precedence of H1N1/2009, a virus with high
transmissibility and low severity, that demonstrated the inadequacy of the existing
international collaboration. Mexico also stands as the U.S. nearest possible pan-
demic incubator. We hope that the above contributions will help to enhance the U.S.
preparedness and response planning for influenza pandemics.
7.3 Future Research
The outbreak detection delay was found to be a significant determinant of the
effectiveness of any resource sharing strategy. The ability of our model to project
expected outbreak paths can pinpoint the regions requiring higher level of surveillance.
Hence, one of the future research opportunities would be to support the design of an
efficient countrywide surveillance system, including the number and placement of
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laboratories and development of sampling strategies. In particular, we would like to
explore the logistics required for a Mexican pandemic surveillance system.
Our conclusions were drawn based on a testbed of Mexico. At this point, we can-
not say whether the conclusions will apply to other countries, particularly those with
different regional demographics and the prevalent domestic transportation modes.
Moreover, we have only considered a “one country - one country” type of collabo-
ration. It will be both desirable and very challenging to examine international col-
laboration involving multiple resource donors and pandemic incubators. A necessary
part of such examination will be the design of an improved global outbreak alert and
response network (GOARN).
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Appendix A
Repository of Mexico Data
In this appendix we list all regions, their population, quadrant classification, and
coordinates, shown in Figure 13. The national average percentage of industrial busi-
nesses was 35% while the national mean of the average business size was 4.8 employees.
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Region Quadrant Population
% of Industrial 
Businesses
Average 
Company Size
1. Pinos, Zacatecas 1 825,881 32.5% 2.5
2. Fresnillo, Zacatecas 1 551,896 33.9% 4.2
3. Tizimín, Yucatán 2 1,043,294 42.8% 3.5
4. Mérida, Yucatán 3 781,549 38.7% 6.4
5. Tierra Blanca, 
Veracruz 2 883,261 37.3% 2.8
6. Martínez de la Torre, 
Veracruz 2 680,586 36.0% 2.8
7. Tantoyuca, Veracruz 2 622,439 37.1% 3.0
8. Poza Rica de Hidalgo, 
Veracruz 1 1,025,364 34.7% 3.4
9. Coatepec, Veracruz 1 1,184,980 32.2% 2.9
10. Veracruz, Veracruz 3 654,410 38.0% 6.5
11. San Andrés Tuxtla, 
Veracruz 1 303,827 35.1% 3.1
12. Córdoba, Veracruz 2 520,710 36.1% 4.4
13. Coatzacoalcos, 
Veracruz 2 877,007 35.5% 4.5
14. Xalapa, Enríquez, 
Veracruz 2 482,113 40.8% 4.1
15. Tlaxcala de 
Xicohténcatl, Tlaxcala 2 583,922 37.1% 3.2
16. Huamantla, Tlaxcala 1 503,078 32.5% 3.3
17. San Fernando, 
Tamaulipas 1 206,541 33.7% 3.3
18. Heroica Matamoros, 
Tamaulipas 3 527,595 40.6% 8.2
19. Ciudad Victoria, 
Tamaulipas 2 589,529 37.9% 4.7
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Region Quadrant Population
% of Industrial 
Businesses
Average 
Company Size
20. Tampico, Tamaulipas 3 661,272 39.7% 6.5
21. Reynosa, Tamaulipas 3 636,551 36.5% 9.3
22. Nuevo Laredo, 
Tamaulipas 3 423,964 40.4% 5.8
23. Macuspana, Tabasco 2 526,887 39.1% 3.3
24. Cunduacán, Tabasco 2 349,645 43.4% 3.6
25. Cárdenas, Tabasco 2 557,294 36.3% 4.0
26. Villahermosa, 
Tabasco 3 558,569 40.1% 6.3
27. Ciudad Obregón, 
Sonora 3 600,291 44.3% 6.3
28. Navojoa, Sonora 2 432,274 40.5% 4.6
29. Heroica Nogales, 
Sonora 3 679,908 40.8% 7.2
30. Hermosillo, Sonora 3 704,542 47.0% 7.3
31. Navolato, Sinaloa 2 469,209 37.4% 4.2
32. Mazatlán, Sinaloa 3 620,821 40.7% 6.0
33. Guasave, Sinaloa 3 738,985 42.5% 5.2
34. Culiacán Rosales, 
Sinaloa 3 796,335 44.6% 6.1
35. Rioverde, San Luis 
Potosí 1 819,897 28.3% 3.1
36. Ciudad Valles, San 
Luis Potosí 2 646,287 36.8% 3.2
37. San Luis Potosí, San 
Luis Potosí 3 959,906 39.5% 6.3
38. Cozumel, Quintana 
Roo 4 728,854 31.3% 6.1
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Region Quadrant Population
% of Industrial 
Businesses
Average 
Company Size
39. Cancún, Quintana 
Roo 3 574,441 36.0% 8.7
40. Cadereyta de 
Montes, Querétaro 1 237,688 26.9% 3.1
41. San Juan del Río, 
Querétaro 3 630,763 37.5% 6.4
42. Santiago de 
Querétaro, Querétaro 3 734,608 36.6% 6.7
43. Tehuacan, Puebla 2 553,986 39.2% 4.3
44. Huauchinango, 
Puebla 1 676,386 35.0% 2.4
45. Teziutlan, Puebla 2 432,106 37.3% 3.9
46. Atlixco, Puebla 1 504,321 34.4% 2.5
47. Amozoc de Mota, 
Puebla 1 524,514 34.1% 2.6
48. Heroica Puebla de 
Zaragoza, Puebla 3 1,486,068 36.3% 5.1
49. Palmar de Bravo, 
Puebla 2 805,462 39.0% 2.2
50. San Martin 
Texmelucan de 2 500,730 39.3% 4.8
51. Santiago Pinotepa 
Nacional, Oaxaca 1 1,037,783 32.1% 2.4
52. San Juan Bautista 
Valle Nacional, Oaxaca 2 424,182 38.4% 2.8
53. Heroica Ciudad de 
Huajuapan de León, 1 398,818 28.6% 2.6
54. Santo Domingo 
Tehuantepec, Oaxaca 1 613,411 32.2% 2.9
55. Oaxaca de Juárez, 
Oaxaca 1 456,488 33.2% 3.6
56. Salina Cruz, Oaxaca 2 352,193 40.6% 2.8
57. San Juan Bautista 
Tuxtepec, Oaxaca 2 477,403 37.6% 3.2
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58. Ciudad San Nicolás 
de los Garza, Nuevo 3 476,761 39.1% 10.1
59. Ciudad Monterrey, 
Nuevo León 3 1,133,826 41.5% 9.0
60. Ciudad Benito 
Juárez, Nuevo León 4 249,559 33.7% 6.0
61. Ciudad Guadalupe, 
Nuevo León 3 691,965 37.7% 6.4
62. Ciudad General 
Escobedo, Nuevo León 4 299,428 27.2% 6.5
63. Ciudad Santa 
Catarina, Nuevo León 3 382,039 42.2% 15.7
64. Ciudad Apodaca, 
Nuevo León 4 418,971 32.5% 14.5
65. Linares, Nuevo León 4 560,331 33.4% 6.0
66. Tepic, Nayarit 2 678,365 38.0% 4.0
67. Acaponeta, Nayarit 1 279,019 34.2% 3.5
68. Yautepec de 
Zaragoza, Morelos 1 759,546 29.7% 2.7
69. Cuernavaca, Morelos 1 698,204 34.5% 4.4
70. Cuautla, Morelos 1 160,339 29.9% 2.9
71. Puruándiro, 
Michoacán 1 931,317 32.5% 2.7
72. Heroica Zitácuaro, 
Michoacán 2 550,109 35.6% 2.5
73. Uruapan, Michoacán 2 916,206 41.4% 3.2
74. La Piedad de 
Cabadas, Michoacán 2 348,460 35.7% 3.1
75. Pátzcuaro, 
Michoacán 2 214,324 46.7% 2.5
76. Apatzingán de la 
Constitución, Michoacán 2 179,115 35.3% 2.8
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77. Morelia, Michoacán 2 684,373 39.0% 4.2
78. Ciudad Lázaro 
Cárdenas, Michoacán 1 163,367 34.3% 4.4
79. Ciudad de México, 
Distrito Federal 4 19,308,938 33.1% 6.4
80. Ixtlahuaca de Rayón, 
México 1 1,472,902 29.8% 4.3
81. Toluca de Lerdo, 
México 4 747,536 33.0% 5.5
82. Amecameca de 
Juárez, México 1 213,118 29.1% 2.5
83. Texcoco de Mora, 
México 1 490,663 32.7% 3.0
84. Metepec, México 1 282,906 31.5% 3.8
85. Tenancingo de 
Degollado, México 1 1,590,998 28.9% 3.4
86. Autlán de Navarro, 
Jalisco 1 589,289 31.5% 3.0
87. Ciudad Guzmán, 
Jalisco 2 195,554 36.4% 3.2
88. Zapopan, Jalisco 3 1,156,203 37.4% 8.1
89. Ocotlán, Jalisco 4 761,727 32.6% 6.0
90. Lagos de Moreno, 
Jalisco 1 910,743 33.1% 3.7
91. Tequila, Jalisco 1 111,663 25.9% 3.2
92. Tonalá, Jalisco 2 408,805 36.5% 3.2
93. Tlaquepaque, Jalisco 4 563,086 34.4% 4.9
94. Tala, Jalisco 1 261,837 31.4% 3.1
95. Puerto Vallarta, 
Jalisco 4 220,558 32.7% 6.2
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96. Guadalajara, Jalisco 3 1,600,954 39.8% 6.7
97. Tula de Allende, 
Hidalgo 1 775,896 34.5% 4.2
98. Pachuca de Soto, 
Hidalgo 2 660,334 36.7% 4.2
99. Tulancingo, Hidalgo 2 391,654 37.1% 3.1
100. Huejutla de Reyes, 
Hidalgo 1 530,640 33.4% 2.8
101. Chilpancingo de los 
Bravo, Guerrero 1 391,281 31.6% 2.6
102. Teloloapan, 
Guerrero 2 312,102 51.2% 2.4
103. Ixtapa Zihuatanejo, 
Guerrero 1 648,020 31.1% 3.1
104. Iguala de la 
Independencia, 2 251,638 39.1% 2.5
105. Tlapa de 
Comonfort, Guerrero 1 774,876 31.3% 2.2
106. Acapulco de Juárez, 
Guerrero 1 718,103 28.8% 4.6
107. Acámbaro, 
Guanajuato 1 638,594 31.3% 2.7
108. Guanajuato, 
Guanajuato 1 799,418 31.3% 4.3
109. San Miguel de 
Allende, Guanajuato 1 486,713 30.8% 4.0
110. Irapuato, 
Guanajuato 2 698,654 35.4% 4.7
111. Pénjamo, 
Guanajuato 2 592,141 35.4% 3.9
112. León de los 
Aldama, Guanajuato 3 1,279,590 39.1% 6.3
113. Celaya, Guanajuato 3 416,539 37.7% 5.3
114. El Salto, Durango 1 563,483 29.6% 3.5
Appendix A (Continued)
Table A1 (Continued)
70
Region Quadrant Population
% of Industrial 
Businesses
Average 
Company Size
115. Gómez Palacio, 
Durango 3 435,114 37.3% 9.4
116. Victoria de 
Durango, Durango 3 528,557 42.5% 4.9
117. Guadalupe y Calvo, 
Chihuahua 1 423,728 31.9% 4.0
118. Delicias, Chihuahua 3 225,008 35.6% 5.3
119. Hidalgo del Parral, 
Chihuahua 2 119,061 36.5% 4.5
120. Cuauhtémoc, 
Chihuahua 3 436,736 35.8% 7.6
121. Juárez, Chihuahua 3 1,314,400 35.5% 11.8
122. Chihuahua, 
Chihuahua 3 759,493 39.2% 8.9
123. Tila, Chiapas 1 446,808 17.4% 2.4
124. Ocosingo, Chiapas 1 613,709 21.1% 2.6
125. Chiapa de Corzo, 
Chiapas 1 212,892 28.1% 2.8
126. Venustiano 
Carranza, Chiapas 1 492,055 29.3% 2.5
127. Villaflores, Chiapas 1 519,985 34.1% 3.0
128. Tapachula de 
Córdova y Ordóñez, 1 635,905 32.0% 3.1
129. Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 
Chiapas 2 568,792 35.5% 4.2
130. La Trinitaria, 
Chiapas 1 195,868 22.7% 2.3
131. Reforma, Chiapas 1 311,157 24.7% 4.1
132. San Cristóbal de las 
Casas, Chiapas 1 333,800 27.5% 3.0
133. Comitán de 
Domínguez, Chiapas 1 184,008 29.5% 2.3
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134. Colima, Colima 2 237,878 41.3% 4.7
135. Manzanillo, Colima 1 263,524 34.6% 4.5
136. Cuauhtémoc, 
Colima 1 70,684 29.1% 3.4
137. Ciudad Acuña, 
Coahuila 4 212,788 30.3% 13.3
138. San Buenaventura, 
Coahuila 4 56,358 28.1% 6.3
139. Parras de la Fuente, 
Coahuila 4 90,242 27.0% 5.5
140. Torreón, Coahuila 3 1,155,364 40.5% 8.6
141. Matamoros, 
Coahuila 1 246,271 30.2% 4.3
142. Piedras Negras, 
Coahuila 3 292,553 35.6% 8.4
143. Saltillo, Coahuila 3 727,500 37.3% 8.0
144. Monclova, Coahuila 4 303,368 35.2% 7.2
145. Ciudad del Carmen, 
Campeche 4 378,869 35.1% 6.7
146. Hopelchén, 
Campeche 1 58,972 23.3% 3.1
147. Campeche, 
Campeche 2 326,394 36.4% 4.5
148. Santa Rosalía, Baja 
California Sur 2 133,106 43.7% 4.3
149. La Paz, Baja 
California Sur 3 387,716 41.9% 5.8
150. Tijuana, Baja 
California 3 1,485,310 40.6% 9.8
151. Ensenada, Baja 
California 3 510,367 41.3% 6.3
152. Mexicali, Baja 
California 3 860,288 43.0% 8.9
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153. Aguascalientes, 
Aguascalientes 3 877,498 38.1% 6.2
154. Rincón de Romos, 
Aguascalientes 1 136,762 27.3% 3.8
155. Calvillo, 
Aguascalientes 1 58,180 30.6% 3.2
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Appendix B
Simulator Flow Graph
The following figure represents a flowchart of the single-region simulation model.
Figure B1: Simulator Flow Graph
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Appendix C
Input and Output Files
Table C1: Input Files
File name Content
age children.txt Column 1: Age group
Column i+1: CDF of region i, for i=1,2,...,155
Column 157: School type
Column 158: Age group
age adults.txt Column 1: Age group
Column i+1: CDF of region i, for i=1,2,...,155
Column 157: Age group
households.txt Column 1: Number of adults in the household
Column 2: Number of children in the household
Column i+2: CDF of region i, for i=1,2,...,155
workplaces.txt Column 1: Business type
Column 2i: Number of businesses per type in region i,
for i=1,2,...,155
Column 2i+1: CDF of people working in each businesses
type in region i, for i=1,2,...,155
Column 312: Number of subgroups
Column 313: Percentage of weekday errands
Column 314: Percentage of weekend errands
Column 315: Percentage of voluntary quarantine errands
travel.txt Column 1 and Row 1: Region ID
Column i, Row j: Probability to travel from Region i to
Region j, for i=1,2,...,155, and j=1,2,...,155
serologic.txt Column 1: Lower bound age
Column 2: Upper bound age
Column 3: Scale factor
mortality.txt Column 1: Age group
Column 2: Mortality probability
contact probability.txt Column 1: Contact type
Columns 2 and 3: Not used
Column 4: Contact probability
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Table C2: Output Files
File name Content
SummaryRegion.txt Region ID
Day
Population size
Number of workplaces
Number of mixing groups
Antiviral risk group
Vaccination risk group
Region status
Total cost
Dead cost
Quarantine cost
Daily contacts
Daily infected cases
Daily fatality ratio
Infected
Infected by age group
Recovered
Recovered by age group
Deaths
Deaths by age group
Asymptomatic cases
Visits to doctor
Visits to doctor by age group
Individuals in quarantine
Individuals in quarantine by age group
Antiviral stockpile
Vaccination capacity
Vaccine stockpile
Vaccination period
Quarantine compliance
Quarantine category
ContactProcess.txt Day
Daily contacts
Daily infected cases
Daily contacts in households and workplaces
Daily infected cases in households and workplaces
ReproductionNumber.txt Region ID
Day
Daily infection number
Sum reproduction number
Average reproduction number
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Appendix D
Relationships in the Scenario Manager
Figure D1: Relationships in the Scenario Manager
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Appendix E
Calibration Values
In this appendix, we summarize the values obtained from the calibration process.
We display the values of ρ = 1100, 1175, 1250, 1325, 1575 since they were the most
common stable values obtained for most of the regions and seeds. However, some
regions had their stable values as low as ρ = 975 and as high as ρ = 1575. Since we
wanted to guarantee that an outbreak will start and sustain in any of the regions, the
value of ρ = 1575 was chosen. Cells highlighted in orange indicate that the simulation
was stopped by reaching the maximum value of days.
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Region Seed 1100 1175 1250 1325 1375 1575 Stable level Quadrant Population
1 22 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.80 1100 1           825,882 
1 23 0.67 0.74 0.78 0.80 1100 1           825,883 
1 20 0.64 0.74 0.77 0.80 1100 1           825,881 
2 20 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.89 1100 1           551,896 
3 22 0.26 0.81 0.85 0.87 1175 2        1,043,295 
3 23 0.00 0.81 0.85 0.87 1175 2        1,043,296 
3 20 0.03 0.21 0.85 0.87 1175 2        1,043,294 
4 20 0.12 0.81 0.85 0.87 1175 3           781,549 
5 20 0.01 0.33 0.85 0.88 1175 2           883,261 
6 20 0.00 0.46 0.86 0.88 1175 2           680,586 
7 22 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.87 1250 2           622,440 
7 23 0.00 0.01 0.84 0.87 1250 2           622,441 
7 20 0.00 0.03 0.75 0.88 1250 2           622,439 
8 20 0.00 0.80 0.88 1175 1        1,025,364 
9 22 0.00 0.01 0.85 0.88 1250 1        1,184,981 
9 23 0.00 0.18 0.85 0.88 1250 1        1,184,982 
9 20 0.00 0.02 0.56 0.88 1250 1        1,184,980 
10 20 0.00 0.82 0.85 0.87 1175 3           654,410 
11 20 0.01 0.81 0.86 0.88 1175 1           303,827 
12 20 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 2           520,710 
13 22 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 2           877,007 
13 23 0.00 0.82 0.85 0.87 1175 2           877,007 
13 20 0.63 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 2           877,007 
14 20 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 2           482,113 
15 22 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 2           583,923 
15 23 0.78 0.83 0.85 0.87 1100 2           583,924 
15 20 0.20 0.82 0.85 0.87 1175 2           583,922 
16 22 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.89 1250 1           503,078 
16 23 0.00 0.37 0.87 0.89 1250 1           503,078 
16 20 0.00 0.17 0.86 0.89 1250 1           503,078 
17 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 1325 1           206,541 
18 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 1325 3           527,595 
19 20 0.00 0.07 0.83 0.86 1250 2           589,529 
20 22 0.00 0.78 0.83 0.86 1175 3           661,273 
20 23 0.00 0.78 0.82 0.86 1175 3           661,274 
20 20 0.00 0.53 0.83 0.86 1175 3           661,272 
21 22 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.75 1325 3           636,551 
21 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 1325 3           636,551 
21 20 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.79 1325 3           636,551 
22 20 0.01 0.09 0.81 0.85 1250 3           423,964 
23 22 0.00 0.55 0.85 0.88 1250 2           526,887 
23 23 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 1250 2           526,887 
23 20 0.00 0.20 0.85 0.88 1250 2           526,887 
24 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.89 0.92 1375 2           349,645 
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25 22 0.00 0.80 0.85 0.88 1175 2           557,295 
25 23 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.88 1250 2           557,296 
25 20 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.88 1325 2           557,294 
26 22 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 3           558,570 
26 23 0.76 0.82 0.85 0.88 1100 3           558,571 
26 20 0.00 0.82 0.85 0.87 1175 3           558,569 
27 20 0.00 0.76 0.86 1250 3           600,291 
28 20 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.84 1325 2           432,274 
29 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 1325 3           679,908 
30 22 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.85 1325 3           704,542 
30 23 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.85 1325 3           704,542 
30 20 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.85 1325 3           704,542 
31 23 0.83 0.89 1325 2           469,209 
31 22 0.01 0.89 1375 2           469,209 
31 20 0.86 0.89 1325 2           469,209 
32 22 0.00 0.80 0.84 0.88 1175 3           620,821 
32 23 0.03 0.80 0.85 0.88 1175 3           620,821 
32 20 0.05 0.80 0.85 0.88 1175 3           620,821 
33 20 0.01 0.15 0.85 0.88 1250 3           738,985 
34 22 0.00 0.79 0.84 0.87 1175 3           796,336 
34 23 0.00 0.80 0.85 0.87 1175 3           796,337 
34 20 0.01 0.67 0.85 0.87 1175 3           796,335 
35 20 0.18 0.86 0.88 0.90 1175 1           819,897 
35 22 0.00 0.86 0.88 0.90 1175 1           819,897 
35 23 0.18 0.86 0.88 0.90 1175 1           819,897 
36 20 0.00 0.84 0.88 0.89 1175 2           646,287 
37 20 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.89 1100 3           959,906 
38 22 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.88 1100 4           728,855 
38 23 0.78 0.82 0.88 1100 4           728,856 
38 20 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.88 1100 4           728,854 
39 20 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.89 1100 3           574,441 
40 20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.90 1375 1           237,688 
41 20 0.01 0.08 0.85 0.88 1250 3           630,763 
42 22 0.00 0.81 0.85 0.87 1175 3           734,609 
42 23 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 3           734,610 
42 20 0.09 0.82 0.85 0.87 1175 3           734,608 
43 20 0.00 0.85 0.87 0.89 1175 2           553,986 
44 20 0.00 0.16 0.88 0.90 1250 1           676,386 
45 22 0.03 0.01 0.88 0.89 1250 2           432,107 
45 23 0.06 0.84 0.88 0.89 1175 2           432,108 
45 20 0.00 0.36 0.88 0.90 1250 2           432,106 
46 20 0.01 0.85 0.88 0.90 1175 1           504,321 
47 20 0.57 0.85 0.88 0.89 1100 1           524,514 
48 20 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.89 1100 3        1,486,068 
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49 20 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.90 1250 2           805,462 
50 20 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.89 1100 2           500,730 
51 20 0.00 0.89 0.90 1250 1        1,037,783 
51 22 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.90 1100 1        1,037,784 
51 23 0.82 0.86 0.89 0.90 1100 1        1,037,785 
52 20 0.82 0.86 0.88 0.90 1100 2           424,182 
53 20 0.83 0.87 0.88 0.90 1100 1           398,818 
54 20 0.45 0.87 0.88 0.90 1175 1           613,411 
55 20 0.80 975 1           456,488 
55 23 975 1           456,488 
55 25 0.80 975 1           456,488 
55 22 0.80 1025 1           456,488 
56 20 0.81 0.85 0.87 0.88 1100 2           352,193 
57 20 0.81 0.86 0.88 0.90 1100 2           477,403 
58 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.87 0.91 1325 3           476,761 
58 23 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 0.87 0.91 1325 3           476,761 
58 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.91 1375 3           476,761 
59 20 0.58 0.82 0.85 1100 3        1,133,826 
60 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.91 1375 4           249,559 
60 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.91 1500 4           249,559 
60 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.91 1425 4           249,559 
61 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.87 0.91 1325 3           691,965 
62 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.82 0.91 1375 4           299,429 
62 23 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.83 0.91 1375 4           299,430 
62 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.91 1375 4           299,428 
63 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.91 1375 3           382,039 
64 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.82 1575 4           418,971 
64 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 1575 4           418,971 
64 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 1575 4           418,971 
65 22 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.83 1325 4           560,332 
65 23 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.84 1325 4           560,333 
65 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.86 0.91 1325 4           560,331 
66 20 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 2           678,365 
67 20 0.80 0.88 1175 1           279,019 
68 20 0.77 0.82 0.85 1100 1           759,546 
69 20 0.76 0.81 0.84 0.86 1100 1           698,204 
70 20 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.84 1100 1           160,339 
70 22 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.84 1100 1           160,339 
70 23 0.74 0.79 0.82 0.84 1100 1           160,339 
71 20 0.00 0.85 0.88 0.90 1175 1           931,317 
72 20 0.80 0.85 0.87 0.89 1100 2           550,109 
73 20 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.88 1100 2           916,206 
74 20 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.89 1100 2           348,460 
74 22 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.89 1100 2           348,461 
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74 23 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.89 1100 2           348,462 
75 20 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 2           214,324 
76 22 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.88 1100 2           179,115 
76 23 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.88 1100 2           179,115 
76 20 0.00 0.84 0.86 0.88 1175 2           179,115 
77 20 0.79 0.87 1100 2           684,373 
77 22 0.79 1025 2           684,373 
77 25 0.78 1100 2           684,373 
78 20 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 1           163,367 
79 4     19,308,938 
80 20 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.86 1250 1        1,472,902 
81 22 0.23 0.79 0.85 1175 4           747,536 
81 23 0.80 1175 4           747,536 
81 20 0.08 0.80 0.85 1175 4           747,536 
82 20 0.01 0.80 0.84 0.87 1175 1           213,118 
82 22 0.22 0.80 0.84 0.87 1175 1           213,119 
82 23 0.34 0.00 0.84 0.87 1250 1           213,120 
83 20 0.09 0.80 0.84 0.86 1175 1           490,663 
84 20 0.74 0.80 0.83 0.86 1100 1           282,906 
85 20 0.00 0.68 0.84 0.87 1175 1        1,590,998 
86 20 0.77 0.82 0.86 0.88 1100 1           589,289 
86 22 0.77 0.82 0.86 0.88 1100 1           589,290 
86 23 0.76 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 1           589,291 
87 20 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 2           195,554 
88 22 0.00 0.00 0.88 1325 3        1,156,204 
88 23 0.00 0.06 0.85 0.88 1250 3        1,156,205 
88 20 0.00 0.06 0.85 0.88 1250 3        1,156,203 
89 22 0.00 0.81 0.86 0.87 1175 4           761,727 
89 25 0.00 0.81 0.85 0.87 1175 4           761,727 
89 20 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.87 1250 4           761,727 
90 20 0.65 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 1           910,743 
91 20 0.00 0.81 0.86 0.89 1175 1           111,663 
91 23 0.17 0.70 0.86 0.89 1175 1           111,663 
91 22 0.00 0.09 0.86 0.89 1250 1           111,663 
92 20 0.00 0.82 0.86 0.89 1175 2           408,805 
93 22 0.01 0.05 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.93 1250 4           563,086 
93 23 0.00 0.02 0.80 0.00 0.90 0.93 1250 4           563,086 
93 20 0.00 0.60 0.86 0.89 0.90 0.93 1175 4           563,086 
94 20 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.89 1100 1           261,837 
94 22 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 1           261,838 
94 23 0.78 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 1           261,839 
95 22 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 4           220,559 
95 23 0.77 0.82 0.85 1100 4           220,560 
95 20 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 4           220,558 
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96 22 0.75 0.80 1100 3        1,600,954 
96 23 0.76 0.80 1100 3        1,600,954 
96 20 0.46 0.80 1175 3        1,600,954 
97 20 0.00 0.84 0.87 0.89 1175 1           775,896 
98 20 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 2           660,334 
98 22 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 2           660,335 
98 23 0.79 0.83 0.86 0.88 1100 2           660,336 
99 20 0.79 0.83 0.87 1100 2           391,654 
100 20 0.00 0.11 0.85 1250 1           530,640 
101 20 0.84 0.87 0.88 0.90 1100 1           391,281 
102 20 0.25 0.87 0.89 0.90 1175 2           312,102 
102 22 0.69 0.87 0.89 0.90 1100 2           312,102 
102 23 0.69 0.87 0.89 0.90 1100 2           312,102 
103 20 0.84 0.87 0.89 0.90 1100 1           648,020 
104 20 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.88 1100 2           251,638 
105 20 0.07 0.88 0.90 0.91 1175 1           774,876 
106 20 0.83 1025 1           718,103 
106 22 0.83 1025 1           718,103 
106 25 0.83 1025 1           718,103 
107 20 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.88 1100 1           638,594 
108 20 0.00 0.85 0.88 0.90 1175 1           799,418 
109 20 0.00 0.84 0.88 0.89 1175 1           486,713 
109 22 0.00 0.85 0.87 0.89 1175 1           486,714 
109 23 0.00 0.85 0.87 0.89 1175 1           486,715 
110 20 0.22 0.84 1175 2           698,654 
110 22 0.23 0.84 1175 2           698,654 
110 25 0.00 0.85 1200 2           698,654 
111 20 0.02 0.85 0.88 0.89 1175 2           592,141 
112 20 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.89 1100 3        1,279,590 
113 20 0.80 0.84 0.86 0.88 1100 3           416,539 
114 20 0.07 0.83 0.87 0.89 1175 1           563,483 
115 20 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.88 1250 3           435,114 
116 20 0.00 0.84 0.87 0.88 1175 3           528,557 
116 22 0.79 0.84 0.87 0.88 1100 3           528,558 
116 23 0.80 0.84 0.87 0.88 1100 3           528,559 
117 20 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.84 1325 1           423,728 
118 20 0.00 0.78 0.84 0.86 1175 3           225,008 
119 20 0.75 0.80 0.84 0.86 1100 2           119,061 
120 20 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.82 1325 3           436,736 
121 22 0.00 0.54 0.856 1325 3        1,314,400 
121 23 0.72 0.86 1325 3        1,314,400 
121 20 0.00 0.00 0.809 1400 3        1,314,400 
122 20 0.00 0.10 0.82 0.86 1250 3           759,493 
123 20 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.90 1250 1           446,808 
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123 22 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.90 1250 1           446,808 
123 23 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.90 1250 1           446,808 
124 20 0.69 0.88 0.89 0.91 1100 1           613,709 
125 20 0.01 0.85 0.89 0.91 1175 1           212,892 
126 20 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.90 1100 1           492,055 
127 20 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.90 1100 1           519,985 
128 20 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.90 1100 1           635,905 
129 20 0.84 0.86 0.88 1100 2           568,792 
130 20 0.61 0.87 0.89 0.91 1175 1           195,868 
131 20 0.83 0.87 0.89 0.90 1100 1           311,157 
132 20 0.82 0.85 0.87 0.88 1100 1           333,800 
133 20 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.89 1100 1           184,008 
134 20 0.70 0.77 0.81 0.84 1100 2           237,878 
135 20 0.72 0.79 0.83 0.85 1100 1           263,524 
136 20 0.01 0.78 0.83 0.86 1175 1             70,684 
137 23 0.00 0.56 0.83 0.89 1325 4           212,788 
137 22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.89 1425 4           212,788 
137 20 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.84 0.89 1425 4           212,788 
138 22 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.90 1575 4             56,359 
138 23 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.90 1575 4             56,360 
138 20 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.79 1325 4             56,358 
139 22 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.61 0.87 0.91 1325 4             90,242 
139 23 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.87 0.91 1375 4             90,242 
139 20 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.84 0.84 0.91 1325 4             90,242 
140 20 0.00 0.46 0.82 0.85 1250 3        1,155,364 
141 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 1325 1           246,271 
142 20 0.00 0.11 0.83 0.90 1325 3           292,553 
142 22 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.90 1325 3           292,553 
142 23 0.00 0.05 0.84 0.90 1325 3           292,553 
143 20 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.86 1250 3           727,500 
144 23 0.00 0.02 0.81 0.85 1250 4           303,368 
144 22 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.85 1325 4           303,368 
144 20 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.86 1250 4           303,368 
145 22 0.74 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 4           378,870 
145 23 0.75 0.81 0.85 0.87 1100 4           378,871 
145 20 0.00 0.81 0.85 0.87 1175 4           378,869 
146 20 0.00 0.01 0.89 1325 1             58,972 
147 20 0.77 0.82 0.85 0.87 1100 2           326,394 
148 20 0.61 0.78 0.81 0.85 1100 2           133,106 
149 20 0.03 0.78 0.83 0.86 1175 3           387,716 
150 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 0.63 1375 3        1,485,310 
151 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 1325 3           510,367 
151 22 0.00 0.05 0.80 0.84 1250 3           510,368 
151 23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 1325 3           510,369 
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152 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 1325 3           860,288 
153 20 0.23 0.80 0.84 0.87 1175 3           877,498 
154 20 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.87 1325 1           136,762 
155 20 0.31 0.81 0.84 0.87 1175 1             58,180 
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Appendix F
List of Economically Undeveloped Regions
Table F1: List of Economically Undeveloped Regions
Region Population
5. Tierra Blanca, Veracruz 883,261
6. Mart´ınez de la Torre, Veracruz 680,586
7. Tantoyuca, Veracruz 622,439
8. Poza Rica de Hidalgo, Veracruz 1’025,364
9. Coatepec, Veracruz 1’184,980
10. Veracruz, Veracruz 654,410
11. San Andre´s Tuxtla, Veracruz 303,827
12. Co´rdoba, Veracruz 520,710
13. Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz 877,007
14. Xalapa, Veracruz 482,113
15. Tlaxcala de Xicohte´ncatl, Tlaxcala 583,922
16. Huamantla, Tlaxcala 503,078
23. Macuspana, Tabasco 526,887
24. Cunduaca´n, Tabasco 349,645
25. Ca´rdenas, Tabasco 557,294
26. Villahermosa, Tabasco 558,569
43. Tehuacan, Puebla 553,986
44. Huauchinango, Puebla 676,386
45. Teziutlan, Puebla 432,106
46. Atlixco, Puebla 504,321
47. Amozoc de Mota, Puebla 524,514
48. Puebla de Zaragoza, Puebla 1’486,068
49. Palmar de Bravo, Puebla 805,462
50. San Martin Texmelucan de Labastida, Puebla 500,730
51. Santiago Pinotepa Nacional, Oaxaca 1’037,783
52. San Juan Bautista Valle Nacional, Oaxaca 424,182
53. Huajuapan de Leo´n, Oaxaca 398,818
54. Santo Domingo Tehuantepec, Oaxaca 613,411
55. Oaxaca de Jua´rez, Oaxaca 456,488
56. Salina Cruz, Oaxaca 352,193
57. San Juan Bautista Tuxtepec, Oaxaca 477,403
68. Yautepec de Zaragoza, Morelos 759,546
69. Cuernavaca, Morelos 698,204
70. Cuautla, Morelos 160,339
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Appendix F (Continued)
Table F1 (Continued)
Region Population
71. Purua´ndiro, Michoaca´n 931,317
72. Zita´cuaro, Michoaca´n 550,109
73. Uruapan, Michoaca´n 916,206
74. La Piedad de Cabadas, Michoaca´n 348,460
75. Pa´tzcuaro, Michoaca´n 214,324
76. Apatzinga´n de la Constitucio´n, Michoaca´n 179,115
77. Morelia, Michoaca´n 684,373
78. Ciudad La´zaro Ca´rdenas, Michoaca´n 163,367
80. Ixtlahuaca de Rayo´n, Me´xico 1’472,902
81. Toluca de Lerdo, Me´xico 747,536
82. Amecameca de Jua´rez, Me´xico 213,118
83. Texcoco de Mora, Me´xico 490,663
84. Metepec, Me´xico 282,906
85. Tenancingo de Degollado, Me´xico 1’590,998
97. Tula de Allende, Hidalgo 775,896
98. Pachuca de Soto, Hidalgo 660,334
99. Tulancingo, Hidalgo 391,654
100. Huejutla de Reyes, Hidalgo 530,640
101. Chilpancingo de los Bravo, Guerrero 391,281
102. Teloloapan, Guerrero 312,102
103. Ixtapa Zihuatanejo, Guerrero 648,020
104. Iguala de la Independencia, Guerrero 251,638
105. Tlapa de Comonfort, Guerrero 774,876
106. Acapulco de Jurez, Guerrero 718,103
123. Tila, Chiapas 446,808
124. Ocosingo, Chiapas 613,709
125. Chiapa de Corzo, Chiapas 212,892
126. Venustiano Carranza, Chiapas 492,055
127. Villaflores, Chiapas 519,985
128. Tapachula, Chiapas 635,905
129. Tuxtla Gutie´rrez, Chiapas 568,792
130. La Trinitaria, Chiapas 195,868
131. Reforma, Chiapas 311,157
132. San Cristo´bal de las Casas, Chiapas 333,800
133. Comita´n de Domı´nguez, Chiapas 184,008
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Appendix G
List of Likely Pandemic Export Regions
Table G1: List of Likely Pandemic Export Regions
Region Population Category
18. Matamoros, Tamaulipas 527,595 Border
21. Reynosa, Tamaulipas 636,551 Border
22. Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas 423,964 Border
29. Nogales, Sonora 679,908 Border
39. Cancu´n, Quintana Roo 574,441 Tourist
65. Linares, Nuevo Len 560,331 Border
79. Ciudad de Me´xico, D.F. 19’308,938 Major city
95. Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco 220,558 Tourist
96. Guadalajara, Jalisco 1’600,954 Major City
117. Guadalupe y Calvo, Chihuahua 423,728 Border
120. Cuauhte´moc, Chihuahua 436,736 Border
121. Ciudad Jua´rez, Chihuahua 1’314,400 Border
137. Ciudad Acun˜a, Coahuila 212,788 Border
138. San Buenaventura, Coahuila 56,358 Border
142. Piedras Negras, Coahuila 292,553 Border
149. La Paz, Baja California Sur 387,716 Tourist
150. Tijuana, Baja California 1’485,310 Border
151. Ensenada, Baja California 510,367 Border
152. Mexicali, Baja California 860,288 Border
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Appendix H
Results on the Normality of the Regression Model
The following figure shows that the errors followed a normal distribution. Conse-
quently, parametric statistics was used to analyze the results of the models.
Figure H1: Results on the Normality of the Regression Model
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Appendix I
Histogram of Lead Time
The following figure shows a histogram of the lead time not considering the cases
when the outbreak was contained at the source.
Figure I1: Histogram of Lead Time
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Appendix J
Percentage of Containment at the Source
The following table shows the percentage of the time that an outbreak was con-
tained at the source given certain strategy.
Table J1: Percentage of Containment at the Source
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